Building Back Better: Making Sense of Drought and Resilience in Afghanistan

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July 2020

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Cover artwork based on photograph taken in Herat by Zohal Nasrat for DACAAR. Used with permission.

Paul Ader
Director – *Think*Clarity
July 2020

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Glossary & terminology

Acronyms

ANSA	Armed Non-State Actors
AoO	Area of origin
AREU	The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit url
CDC	Community Development Council
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM) url
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GIF	Graphics Interchange Format
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HIU	Humanitarian Information Unit – US Department of State url
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre url
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IOM	The International Organization for Migration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSIA	National Statistic and Information Authority (Afghanistan)
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
USAid	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

Other Terms

Other terms used in the report are defined / described below. Some of these are sourced from the literature review in Annex 6 which has been prepared for the project by Magenta Consulting.

- **Drought** is defined in many ways based on region, need and disciplinary approach.[1] These definitions have been grouped into five connected types of drought: meteorological, hydrological, agricultural, ecological and socioeconomic.[2]
    - *Meteorological drought* can be considered as the natural reduction of precipitation over an extended period, usually at least one planting season, compared to the multi-year average for the region.
    - *Hydrological drought* occurs when low water supply becomes evident, especially in streams, reservoirs, and groundwater levels, usually after many months of meteorological drought.
    - *Agricultural drought* happens when water shortage significantly damages or destroys crops.
    - *Ecological drought* refers to the ecological damage caused by lack of soil moisture.
    - *Socioeconomic drought* refers to when water shortage reduces the availability of water, food and other essential commodities for people and the economy as a whole.
- **IDPs** are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, disasters resulting from natural hazards such as droughts, floods and earthquakes or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.
- **IDP Sites** are settlements for internally displaced people. These settlements can be set up initially on an informal basis in locations where IDPs arrive after migrating from their area of origin. The signification framework referred to IDP Sites as IDP Camps.
- **Land tenure** is the legal regime in which land is owned by an individual, who is said to "hold" the land. It determines who can use land, for how long and under what conditions. Tenure may be based both on official laws and policies, and on informal customs. In other words, land tenure system implies a system according to which land is held by an individual or the actual tiller of the land.
- **Livelihoods** comprise the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.
- **Peri-urban area** - An area immediately adjacent to a city or urban area

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[1] Informal conversations with UNDP staff and others suggested that Afghans do not have a specific name for what is referred to here as 'drought' – rather they refer to it as a long dry period. It is suggested later in the report that the term 'drought' may refer specifically to a period formally classified as such by GIRoA. While this may be just a matter of semantics, it may also lead them to respond differently.

[2] Understanding Drought (University of Nevada) url

- **Resilience** of individuals, families and communities is based on their capacity and ability to absorb shocks, adapt to change and transform the environment in which they live.[3] Absorptive capacity is about maintaining stability and requires action to anticipate, plan for, cope with and recover from specific, known shocks and short-term stresses. Adaptive capacity is about flexibility and responsiveness and requires action to make incremental changes through continuous adjustment, learning, and innovation. Transformative capacity is about making fundamental changes to deep socio-political structures that cause or increase vulnerability and risk. Framed in this way, these three capacities could be seen as building on each other: transformation requiring the openness that comes with adaptation and adaptation requiring the stability and energy that comes from being able to absorb shocks and short-term stresses. Years of conflict and repeated disasters resulting from natural hazards in Afghanistan have been a drain on absorptive capacity and have reduced interest and energy in adaptation and transformation. However, it could also be argued that the demand for people, families and communities to cope has increased their capacity to do so by reducing their expectation that anything else is possible and by their cultural reliance on hope and faith.[4]
- **SenseMaker®** is proprietary software that enables narrative-based research in which respondents are asked to describe a relevant experience and then answer visual questions to signify what their experience means to them in their own context. This allows qualitative data to be collected from a large number of respondents and mapped and explored in a quantitative framework. See Annex 1 for more detail on SenseMaker® and Annex 2 for the questions that were asked.
- **Squatters** – this report uses the term squatters as a collective term for individuals and groups who live on common land, contested land or land with an unknown owner. Squatters do not have any land rights or title and many of them live in informal settlements on the outskirts of cities.
- **Wage workers** – this report uses the term wage workers as a collective term for individuals who do not own or rent land and are not 'squatters'. Some wage workers are engaged as farm labourers and others are engaged in non-farming activities.

Gender and generalisation

This report refers to "men" and "women" as a shorthand for "male respondents" and "female respondents"; these terms do not infer that the results can be generalised on a statistical basis to all men or all women in the wider population. Although SenseMaker® collects qualitative data in a quantative framework, it retains the characteristics of qualitative research. This means that it only supports inferential connections between respondents and people with similar profiles.

Likewise, when we refer to "Herat" and "Badghis" we are doing so as a shorthand for respondents in the specific communities where we collected data in these provinces.

[3] Oxfam briefing paper "The Future is a Choice – Absorb, Adapt, Transform Resilience Capacities" url and IDS working paper (Volume 2012 Number 405) "Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny?" url

[4] "Suffering, hope, and entrapment: Resilience and cultural values in Afghanistan" – Research paper by Mark Eggerman & Catherine Panter-Brick in Social Science & Medicine Volume 71, Issue 1, July 2010, Pages 71-83 url

Foreword

The new Afghan National Peace and Development Framework developed by the Government of Afghanistan prioritizes Peace, State-building and Market-building as necessary conditions for greater self-reliance. While well-informed and effective policies, strategies and regulations are essential to achieve this goal, they are not, by themselves, sufficient. As this report shows, they need to be underpinned by action taken by the Government and its partners to deliver services and support in a way that has most impact on the lived experience of local people.

After forty years of war, the Afghan people have become both adaptable and resilient. However, both capacities have been depleted and, in many cases, overwhelmed by the additional impact of repeated drought and other disasters resulting from natural hazards. When multiple shocks and pressures occur in the same period of time, they are likely to reinforce each other causing a multiplier effect. Rising poverty levels, increasing land degradation, a rapidly growing population with mass-urbanization, and now the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 all combine to exacerbate food insecurity, further decrease access to clean drinking water and make the population in drought-affected areas even more vulnerable to future shocks.

Drought is part of a connected web of ecological threats and socio-economic dynamics and must be addressed by decision-makers as a systemic problem. The most cost-effective response is likely to be based on interventions designed to rebuild or strengthen resilience of families and local communities. This is where the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can serve as a roadmap. Understanding the linkages between the SDGs that are most relevant to drought namely SDG-1 (Poverty), SDG-2 (Hunger), SDG-4 (Education), SDG-6 (Sustainable Management of Water) SDG-13 (Climate Action) and SDG-15 (Sustainable land use), will be central to any strategy intended to increase resilience.

This report supports a systemic view of the problem by collecting and analyzing the lived experience of people in Herat and Badghis during the 2018 drought. It highlights the requirement for a more integrated response in resilience programming. One proposal is to use the power of economic modelling to identify the national and regional effect of policy options while at the same time engaging with local communities to discover the impact of these policies on lived experience. The report also raises interesting questions that go to the core of the relationship between humanitarian aid and development. For example, how can we design interventions that lead to a measurable increase in resilience without also getting in the way of self-reliance? What have development and humanitarian actors learned from the drought of 2018 and what are they doing differently now so that when the next severe drought occurs it will cause significantly less displacement and social cost?

This is the first of a series of reports that aim to connect the concerns of local people with government policy decisions and with the new governance arrangements set out in the ANPDF that will be needed in an increasingly uncertain post-COVID-19 world. It makes an important contribution to resilience programming in Afghanistan and I encourage you to read it.

Abdallah Al Dardari
Resident Representative
UNDP Afghanistan

Executive summary

Introduction

The 2018 Afghan drought displaced hundreds of thousands of people and left millions acutely malnourished. UN agencies and international NGOs supported the Afghan government in providing humanitarian aid to IDPs. However, this was by necessity a crisis response.

Addressing the inequalities and divisions exacerbated by the drought requires coordinated and cross-sectoral work to connect humanitarian aid with sustainable development. While progress has been made, far too many IDPs still shelter in informal settlements, unable to rebuild their lives; and many of those who have returned to their land are coping with crushing poverty, debt, destitution, and now, too, with fear and the economic impact of COVID-19.

Narrative data on lived experience

Many organisations have carried out surveys, focus groups and interviews to collect data on the impact of the drought. However, much of this data does not identify the lived experience that underpins how people make decisions and choose to act. The research described in this report was commissioned by UNDP in early 2019 to start to address this gap. It uses SenseMaker®, an innovative research method described in Annex 1, to collect, map, and explore narrative-based data on lived experiences of drought and resilience of 1,300 respondents in the provinces of Herat and Badghis.[5]

Resilience

Over 40 years of conflict and repeated disasters resulting from natural hazards have forced Afghan families and communities to be resilient. However, their coping strategies, many of which involve selling productive assets, consuming seed stock and borrowing money, have made it increasingly difficult to continue to absorb shocks and to adapt to disruptive change. For many families, their resilience may now be based primarily on a combination of faith and hope rather on reserves that can be used to maintain their livelihood.

While conflict led to the displacement of families and communities, many were able to cope as long as they could grow enough or keep sufficient livestock to feed themselves. However, the severity of the drought in addition to the conflict tipped them over the edge and created mass displacement. The slow-onset of the drought coupled with an inability to recognise/accept it (until, perhaps, it was officially declared by the Government) may also have contributed to the high level of displacement because, if any reserves could have been put aside, it was too late to do so.

The multiple interrelated reasons for people leaving their land was evident in the data because respondents did not cite a particular issue – such as water scarcity – for their decision. This also suggests that an improvement in access to safe water (or the end of the drought) may not be sufficient, on its own, to persuade all IDPs to return. A wider strategy is required which uses careful exploration of local circumstances to identify and mitigate cross-sectoral vulnerabilities. If resilience is not rebuilt

[5] SenseMaker® is proprietary software that enables narrative-based research in which respondents are asked to describe a relevant experience and then answer visual questions to signify what their experience means to them in their own context. This allows qualitative data to be collected from a large number of respondents and mapped and explored in a quantitative framework. See Annex 1 for more detail on SenseMaker® and Annex 2 for the questions that were asked.

it will limit Afghanistan's ability to achieve its aim of increased self-reliance and will leave the Afghan people unprepared for the next severe drought, which given the impact of climate change, is just a matter of time.

Marginalisation

The data shows a connection between respondents' land tenure and the way they interpret their lived experience. This in turn points to a difference in how to address/rebuild their resilience. The key issue is that 'squatters' (i.e. respondents living on common land or land with contested tenure) and those living in IDP sites appear marginalised. Many of these respondents feel more threatened by the government and are less willing to engage in community projects such as cooperatives. While this may not be surprising, it creates difficulty and may contribute to problems in security. It would also require trust to be rebuilt alongside – or even before – efforts to bolster resilience.

Marginalisation is also a factor in the level of faith in (or reliance on) government and other formal organisations such as NGOs. Squatters and those at IDP sites showed a stronger propensity to rely on informal sources, such as ANSA, for assistance in addition to aid from government and NGOs.

While faith in government is generally high there is a noticeable difference between men and women who have returned to their communities in Herat. The faith of men in this cohort increases quite markedly when they return to their communities, however that of women remain at the much lower level evident among people in IDP camps. We wondered whether there might be some connection here between women having a more active role in responding to crises and coping with living as IDPs whereas they need to revert to a more traditional role when they return to their communities. Given that this trend is only observed in Herat, it may also reflect differences in governance or aid policy at the provincial level.

Local cooperative schemes

It is noted that while very few respondents said that they were or had been a member of a local cooperative scheme, almost all said they would be willing to participate in one. This is perhaps curious when considered alongside the large number of community schemes associated with the Citizens' Charter initiative[6]. Further exploration is required to validate these results and to confirm that the level of support for cooperatives is associated with motivation to improve community resilience rather than to obtain – and perhaps divert – additional funds. Care would also need to be taken to ensure local sensitivity and an inclusive design process to ensure that new cooperatives do not reinforce existing inequalities, unfairly advantaging some groups and excluding others.

A further complication in implementing new cooperative schemes is that they may accentuate divides between older respondents who prize stability and the closeness of their community, and younger respondents who appear to be more interested in wage labour and participation in an urban-centric cash economy. In an ideal scenario, targeted local cooperatives would provide/support off-farm work in the local community for younger people so that they could participate in the cash economy without damaging the existing cooperative rural ethos and taking labour away from traditional community-based activities such as water management.

[6] The Citizens' Charter is a foundation for realizing the government's self-reliance vision. The Charter is a government commitment to provide every village and city in Afghanistan with basic services, based on each community's own prioritization. url

Recommendations

The findings from this research are analysed, explored and discussed in the main section of the report starting on page 19 and are summarised on page 52. The findings have led to a number of recommendations. These are summarised below and described in full on page 55.

1. Identify and map differences between IDPs who have returned to their land and those who have not; and use this data to create new insights that can help increase returns and resilience
2. Examine the impact of ANSA activity, rural-urban divide and gender on faith in government to confirm that it is being used to greatest effect.
3. Review programming to confirm it addresses gender-specific differences in perceptions about the impact of drought and conflict and differences in generational priorities about livelihoods
4. Investigate the impact of land tenure on sources of risk and assistance
5. Address concerns that local cooperative schemes may adversely impact people who do not have land title
6. Create and maintain a website that provides a consolidated, up to date and categorised list of all current and completed community development projects.
7. Identify and support cross-sectoral local community development activities to strengthen resilience, regain self-reliance and provide an alternative to urbanisation

The report is supported by links to academic and practitioner insights from Afghanistan, as well as by an extensive literature review prepared by Magenta[7]. It has also been updated with a note about COVID-19.

In conclusion, climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of droughts. This requires humanitarian and development agencies to work together on cross-sectoral activities that will help families and communities restore and renew their resilience so that they can survive and recover from COVID-19 and be better prepared for the future.

Given the crises confronting the United Nations today, and an ever more precarious political and economic situation in Afghanistan, resilience programming may not seem a top priority. Yet consigning it to the bottom of the agenda would be a mistake. Herat and Badghis survived the 2018 drought at great and lasting cost. Without substantial assistance, it is unclear if they will get through the next one at all.

[7] Magenta's Literature Review is included at Annex 6.

Khoshk Sali – Published on Documenting Afghanistan url

Update for Covid

Since the end of data collection for the research the world has been changed by the COVID-19 pandemic. These changes may mean that this report no longer fully reflects life today in Herat and Badghis. However, the findings can still contribute to work when we are able to start the long process of recovery and to help build back in a way that is less fragile and more sustainable.

"Unless preventative measures are implemented more than 25 million people could become infected in Afghanistan, with at least 16 million showing symptoms"

Ferozuddin Feroz, Public Health Minister, GIRoA

How has the COVID-19 pandemic changed the context for resilience?

- The survey found that there was a significant generational divide in priorities – older people valued their community, younger people valued jobs. The brunt of COVID-19's impact falls on the elderly. Increased deaths among old people may widen these divides and further increase the proportion of the population moving away from rural communities. This will change the context for resilience programming.
- It is plausible that higher mortality among older people will deprive communities of respected elders, creating leadership vacuums at the local level. This is likely to cause additional confusion and fear, make resilience programming harder to practically implement, and weaken limiters on intracommunal conflict.
- The survey found that 49% of respondents expect the Government to make their lives easier in the future; this faith in government as a positive driver of change is supported by data collected in the 2019 National Survey of the Afghan People. If government fails to take effective action to contain COVID-19, its support may wane. Meanwhile, non-state armed actors who are reported to have acted quickly and decisively to respond to COVID-19 in their areas of influence, may be seen as more effective than the government and, as a result, stand to gain credibility.
- This survey conforms with other research in reporting a significant rural-urban divide, with the perception that rural areas are left behind by government. Public health planning suggests that COVID-19 treatment, and when available a COVID-19 vaccine, should be concentrated in urban areas. This may save lives, but it could come at the cost of further entrenching perceived rural-urban inequity.
- As identified in this survey and other reports, a key Afghan coping strategy in the face of crisis is to sell productive assets such as cattle, as well as land. Given COVID-19's attendant economic impacts, this trend is likely to accelerate. In turn, this will concentrate increased wealth and capability in the hands of a small subset of people rich enough to remain solvent through the crisis and buy up the fire-sold assets. This presents the worrying possibility of further entrenching structural inequity.
- Another traditional coping strategy noted in this survey and elsewhere is for rural workers to temporarily move to cities or abroad for work. This is non-viable under COVID-19 conditions due to lockdowns and reduced economic activity. Without this outlet, COVID-19 may force more Afghans to sell their productive assets and become sharecropping squatters on what was their own land or become precarious IDPs without clear opportunities to make money. Neither choice is appealing from a welfare perspective – nor do they denote resilient social structures.

Men wearing facemasks queue up to receive free wheat from the government emergency committee in Kabul, 21 April 2020. AFP/Wakil Kohsar

How this report can contribute to Afghanistan's recovery from COVID-19

Despite these changes the conclusions of this report can contribute to building back after COVID-19 by highlighting possible areas of social division to mitigate and sounding a clarion call in support for holistic resilience programming.

First, this report identifies a number of social, security, and livelihood divisions arising in the aftermath of crisis. It is important not to correlate the drought and the pandemic – they are different phenomena, with different impacts. However, in general terms, this data can still provide a useful baseline for understanding population reactions to severe stress. For example, existing generational, rural-urban, and land tenure divides are likely to widen further. COVID-19 is not a social leveller. Rather, it cements current inequities and creates new ones. This report may prove useful ground for extrapolation of how this may occur in Afghanistan during and after COVID-19.

Second, this report clearly identifies the cross-sectoral nature of resilience challenges. There is an unconscious temptation in crisis to focus on the most obvious malady – water supplies in the case of drought, public health in a pandemic. This is especially true when aid budgets are likely to be slashed, and donors start triaging their programs. Addressing central concerns is obviously important. However, overfocusing on them increases the risk of failure. As this report notes repeatedly, most people did not become IDPs because of failures in any one area – be that security, water, livestock protection etc. – but rather an increase in stress across the board. Donors and authorities must not abandon a holistic, multidimensional approach to development assistance. If they do, they will fail.

Purpose & scope of research

The **purpose** of the research described in this report was to:

- Use SenseMaker® to collect, map and explore narrative-based data on the lived experience of people in Herat and Badghis provinces during the drought in 2018-19; and
- Identify patterns in the data that provide insight which could be used to enable locally initiated changes to increase resilience and to underpin projects that help connect humanitarian aid with longer-term recovery and development.

The **scope** of the research was specified as a retrospective assessment of how respondents in rural communities and at IDP Sites in Herat and Badghis experienced an event in the previous two years that had a big impact on their ability to stay in their community. The wording of the research question (referred to in SenseMaker® as a 'prompting question') was phrased so that it was relevant to people who were able to stay in their community as well as to those who had moved away. It was also phrased so that it applied to people who stayed or left as a result of drought or conflict or both.



Figure 1 - Prompting question used to ask respondents to describe an experience

Once respondents had described a relevant experience, they were asked to answer a small number of visual sense-making questions to signify what their experience meant to them in their own context. This narrative-based approach collects qualitative data and maps it onto a quantitative framework that can be analysed and explored in near real-time. SenseMaker® and the theory on which it is based is described in Annex 1. A copy of the SenseMaker® signification framework / questionnaire is provided in Annex 2.

Background Information

The survey was conducted in two provinces, Herat and Badghis in western Afghanistan. These provinces were chosen because they were two of the areas worst affected by the drought.

Herat[8] has an estimated population of 2,050,000. It is 77% rural and 23% urban, with the urban population concentrated in Herat City (population: 436,000). It is 50% Pashtun, with the majority of the rest being Tajik. On paper, the province hosts 791 schools with 750,000 students, although exact numbers are hard to verify. The province hosts a substantial number of IDPs. From October to December 2018 there were 544,500 IDPs – just over a quarter of the of the population of the province – living in informal settlements near Herat City. These displaced people were from rural areas in Herat and from neighbouring provinces of Ghor and Badghis. They also included a large number of returnees

8 The background data on Herat and Badghis comes from a range of sources including:

- Afghanistan National Statistic and Information Authority url – Population and crime statistics
- IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix url - Number of IDPs
- SIGAR quarterly report dated April 2019 (p75) url – Number of security incidents
- World Bank: Afghanistan, Province Dashboard url - Conflict Security Index
- Asia Foundation: Data from Justice Section of Survey of the Afghan People 2019 url - Violence and criminal acts

from Iran. While the security situation in Herat is less acute than further north, it was one of the eight provinces with the highest number of security incidents in 2018 and ranked 13th in the wider conflict security index. In addition, 18% of the respondents to the 2019 Afghan Survey of the Afghan People said that they or members of their family had suffered from violence or some criminal act in the previous year and table 3-3 of the NSIA's Afghanistan Statistical Indicators for the 4th Quarter of 2019 shows a 15% increase in number of crimes in 2019 over 2018.

Badghis[8] has an estimated population of 530,000 people, with two major urban centres – Qal'ah-ye Now[9], the provincial capital, with a population of 64,125: and Bala Murghab, with a population of 109,381. The rest of the population is predominately rural. The poverty rate is high, at 61.1% for rural areas, although it is only 18.1% in the cities. 62% of people are Tajik and 28% are Pashtuns. It was the centre of heavy fighting between the government and non-state actors in 2018.

Drought & Displacement

From December 2017 to February 2018, the winter planting season in Afghanistan, precipitation rates were 70% lower than normal. At the same time, warmer weather decreased the snowpack led to a significant reduction in meltwater run-off in March and April.[10] After four years of below average



Figure 2 - HIU Infographic on Drought, Food Security and Displacement in Afghanistan in 2018

9 In the data collection, Qal'ah-ye Now was spelled in English as Qala-e-Naw

10 The warmer temperatures and low snowpack were thought to be associated with the La Niña ocean-atmosphere phenomenon. For more information, see url

rainfall, it was extremely difficult to plant and sustain crops and, by the summer of 2018, it became clear that harvests would be far below what was required to meet basic food needs, let alone sustain the broader agriculture-based economy.

The situation was officially declared as a drought in April 2018[11]. It affected the entire country. Over 10 million Afghans – 28% of the population – were left severely food insecure and over 1 million in need of urgent food aid to survive. [12]

Badghis was particularly severely affected with 44% of its population needing urgent food aid. Overall, an estimated 263,000 people in Badghis and Herat (approximately 11% of the total population) were unable or unwilling to sustain themselves on their land and migrated to urban locations. This had predictably problematic impacts on local services, sanitation, and the economy.[13] The crisis was made even more difficult by migrants returning from Iran and other countries where drought had reduced the availability of work.[14]

The sudden influx of over a quarter million people into the outskirts of Hirat City and Qala-e-Naw provincial capitals in just a few months in 2018 led to the emergence of "19 vast and sprawling informal settlements".[15] In September 2019, just before the collection of data described in this report, there were still 100,000 IDPs mostly in Herat.

Those who stayed on their land also suffered. 84% of surveyed landowners said that production was down by over 50% on their 2017 harvest.[16] With most farming in Afghanistan carried out on a subsistence basis[17], this was devastating. Worse still, the lack of feed and water had led to the loss of 90% of their cattle.[18] Existing data shows that selling productive assets – the coping strategy of last resort – became common place: this, in turn, led to a severe reduction in the money they were able to obtain. For example, the price of sheep in Badghis fell from 8,000 Afghanis to 1,500.[19] Narrative information in an ODI report on livelihood trajectories from three villages in Herat suggest that once productive assets are sold, they are rarely recovered.[20] While some farmers were able to fall-back on growing drought-resistant poppies, these too were badly affected by the drought with a 72% drop in output in Badghis – albeit from a baseline that had significantly increased in 2017.[21] For others, the one remaining way to repay loans was through marrying off their girl children to receive a "bride

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11 Emergency Appeal – IRFC url

12 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Alert url

13 OCHA Drought Response – Situation Report url

14 Return of Undocumented Afghans – IOM Situation Report Jan— Dec 2018 / 01– 05 Jan 2019 url

15 OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview November 2018 url

16 IDMC's 2019 Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) – Spotlight on Afghanistan url

17 FAO Regional Perspectives – Agricultural Statistics url

18 ibid - IDMC

19 "Less Rain and Snowfall in Afghanistan: High level of food assistance needed until early 2019" - Article published by Afghan Analysts Network in July 2018 url

20 Livelihood trajectories in Afghanistan: evidence from three villages in Herat Province. Working paper 54, December 2016 – AREU and ODI url

21 UNODC Afghanistan opium survey 2018 url

price". 161 cases, some for children as young as five, were reported in Herat and Badghis between July and October 2018.[22] Presumably, many more cases were unreported.

While people who are displaced by slow-onset disasters such as droughts have time to pack their belongings and organise their departure and are usually in a better position than those displaced by sudden-onset disasters or conflict, this has not been the case in Afghanistan because the people fleeing the drought had already sold most of their assets.[23]

While the 2018 drought was particularly severe, it was not unprecedented. Severe droughts had occurred in 1970-72 and again either side of 2001 with droughts of varying intensity during eight of the years between 2001 and 2011.[24] The UNEP estimates that Afghanistan will suffer drought conditions every year by 2030[25], while eight of the years between 2001 and 2011 saw droughts of varying intensity. Moreover, 71% of IDPs in Herat said that they would not consider returning to their land under any circumstance. This suggests that the twin problems of drought and displaced people will continue to be a critical issue for Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

Drought Relief Efforts

In October 2018, the United Nations allocated $34.6m in emergency aid to assist victims of the drought. Seven national NGOs, 15 international NGOs and four UN agencies partnered with the Afghan government to deliver vital relief supplies.[26] By January 2019, 435,000 people in Badghis and Herat had received food aid. 60,000 had health support from 21 Mobile Health and Nutrition teams, and 33,000 people were impacted by sanitation efforts – including the rehabilitation of 30 handpumps in Badghis and the construction of 444 latrines in IDP settlements.[27]

While the humanitarian situation remains dire, the most urgent phase of the crisis has passed, and attention must turn to recovery and building community resilience to forestall future emergencies. Even without COVID-19, recovery would have taken many years because of the need to use depleted natural and physical capital (e.g. the availability of grazeland, soil quality and water table) to reverse the effect of livestock destocking, depletion of seed stocks, debts etc.

Informal interviews with individual contributors from FAO, WFP, WorldVision and USAid prior to design of the SenseMaker® signification framework (see Annex 3) indicated that while their agencies were fully engaged with addressing the short-term humanitarian crisis, they were not involved with the longer term resilience planning and programming required to span the gap between humanitarian

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22 Drought, Conflict Driving Afghans to 'Sell' Off Children: UN – GlobePost November 2018 url

23 Ibid - IDMC

24 "… since 1960, the country has experienced drought in 1963-64, 1966-67, 1970-72 and 1998-2006. The period from 1998 to 2005/6 … marked the longest and most severe drought in Afghanistan's known climatic history" - *Excerpt from Afghan Government's Initial National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in November 2015 url*

25 "Climate Change in Afghanistan - What Does It Mean for Rural Livelihoods And Food Security?" UNEP, FAO, WFP url

26 UNOCHA press release 16-October-2018 url

27 World Vision: Afghanistan Drought Response Situation Report | December 2018 & January 2019 url

aid and the development of resilient life styles.[28] These linkages remain a challenge for both the development and aid communities.

Further information on the situation in Herat and Badghis is available in the Literature Review prepared by Magenta and attached in Annex 6.

Figure 3 - Image of Sharak-e-Sabz IDP Site in Herat
Source: https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/02/afghan-struggles-to-rebuild-climate-change-complicates/

[28] IDMC (*ibid*) and other observers also highlighted the initial debate between humanitarian and development agencies on who had the mandate to respond, with many humanitarian agencies suggesting that the emphasis of the response should be on development in the places of origin, and thereby fall to development agencies rather than humanitarians.

Analysis, Exploration and Discussion of Results

This section of the report starts with an **overview of respondents & socio-demographic data**. It then discusses responses to the sense-making questions that form the main part of the research. These are discussed under **three interconnected themes: security**, **livelihoods**, and **communities**

Our analysis is based on identification and exploration of patterns in the sense-making data[29] and is used to derive 10 key findings. These are highlighted in blue boxes in this section and summarised earlier in the report. Selected narratives have been included to illustrate some of the findings.[30]

Each theme starts with a brief note on the question(s) in the SenseMaker® signification framework on which it is based. A full copy of the signification framework is provided in Annex 3.

Profile of respondents

Signified narratives[31] were collected from 1,327 people in 2 districts in Herat province and 3 districts in Badghis province. 64% of these responses were collected in rural communities and 36% in IDP Sites. The names of the districts and IDP sites are shown in the map and table opposite.

The table divides respondents between those who stayed in their communities, those who left and subsequently returned and those who had left their communities but, at the time of the data collection, had not yet returned.

- Of the total 1,327 respondents, approximately 35% stayed in their communities.
- Out of the 65% of respondents who had left their communities, just under half had returned by the time the data was collected.
- Of the 37% of respondents who had not yet returned, approximately two thirds (25% of the total) said they did not expect to return in the future.

As shown below (and on Table 1) these figures vary by community / IDP site.

A higher proportion of respondents in Injil stayed on their land than in any of the other rural communities. This may be due to a slightly higher average wealth (see later), access to more irrigation and their proximity to Herat City.

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[29] Readers who would like to explore the data for themselves are welcome to use the Tableau® workbook that has been created by the authors if UNDP gives them permission to do so.

[30] The original narratives transcribed by the enumerators in Dari and Pashto were probably more rudimentary than the English into which they have been translated. Also: the narrative titles were originally identified by the enumerators and have been revised for this report to highlight what the author sees as the key message.

[31] Signified narratives is a term used to denote the narrative descriptions provided by respondents after they have used their answers to the sense-making questions to signify what their experience means to them in their own context. For more information see Annex 1 on the use of SenseMaker®.



Figure 4 - Map of Herat and Badghis showing districts where data collected
(See Annex 4 for a more detailed map)

Table 1 - Number of respondents in each collection area

Location	Total Number of Respondents			Analysis of Number of Respondents		
				Stayed in community	**Left & returned to community**	**Not yet returned to community**
Herat	**814**	**406**	**408**	**264 (32%)**	**191 (24%)**	**359 (44%)**
Guzarah	167	86	81	69 (41%)	98 (59%)	-
Injil	288	143	145	195 (68%)	93 (32%)	-
Sharak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee IDP Site and clinic	359	177	182	-	-	359
Badghis	**513**	**253**	**260**	**198 (39%)**	**192 (37%)**	**123 (24%)**
Ab-e Kamari	119	60	59	49 (41%)	70 (59%)	-
Muqur	140	68	72	74 (53%)	66 (47%)	-
Qal'ah-ye Now	131	65	66	75 (57%)	56 (43%)	-
Sanjitak & Kharistan IDP Sites	123	60	63	-	-	123
TOTAL	**1327**	**659**	**668**	**462 (35%)**	**383 (29%)**	**482 (36%)**

One quarter of respondents said that they had no intention of returning to their homes. This presents a substantial problem because it requires either long-term operation of IDP sites and/or increased investment in integration of additional residents in urban and peri-urban areas where they are likely to need work outside traditional farming activities. The increased frequency and severity of drought due to climate change means that, unless remedial action is taken, the number of people not willing or able to return to rural communities is likely to increase on a cumulative basis.[32]



Figure 5 - Type of respondent by community

The intentions of respondents at IDP Sites in Herat in our research appear to differ quite considerably from those in the surveys carried out by IOM up to April 2019[33]. In the last of these surveys accessible on the internet 48% of respondents in IDP Sites in Herat said they would not consider returning regardless of the assistance on offer. This compares with 30% in our data. This difference may reflect the 6-month gap between the IOM research and ours (particularly given the fact that the equivalent IOM figure in February was 71%); alternatively, it may reflect a lower degree of 'gaming' that is usually associated with narrative-research based on signification of lived experience.

Magenta's Literature Review in Annex 6, refers to research on what IDPs said they would need to return when asked what they would need to return to their communities (Areas of Origin, AoO) Herat-based IDPs mentioned security, better environmental conditions, humanitarian assistance, and availability of livelihoods; whereas Badghis based IDPs cited security, better environmental conditions, availability of livelihoods and planting season. These are stated here in the order they were given. The slight difference in prioritisation may suggests that IDPs in Badghis are more optimistic than those in Herat about being able to reconstruct their livelihoods so long as the conditions are good. However, this inference would need to be validated through further research.

[32] It is noted, however, that the rural population may only decrease to a level at which balancing factors including the growth of peri-urban areas start having an effect. url

[33] IOM Return Intentions Survey, April 2019: DTM Afghanistan, "Drought Response Situation Report, Herat, Badghis", April 26, 2019 url

Just under 60% of the respondents in both provinces said they owned or rented their land; however, there were significantly more wage earners among the respondents in Badghis. The data indicates that 44% of respondents (158) at the IDP Sites in Herat classified themselves as 'squatters'[34] – the absence of this group amongst respondents in Badghis may benefit from further exploration.



Figure 6 - Community/IDP Site by land tenure

Analysis of type of respondent by land tenure shown below indicates that ***in Badghis most of the people who do not expect to return to their land are wage workers***, whereas in Herat this group includes landowners and 'squatters' as well as wage workers.



Figure 7 - Type of respondent by land tenure

[34] The term 'squatter' is defined in the glossary on page 5. See Annex 4 for supporting data.

Only 10% of respondents said that they were (or had been) members of a local community-based cooperative scheme – but, as shown below, 82% of respondents in Herat and 54% of respondents in Badghis were willing or very willing to do so.[35] Respondents in Bagdhis may be less willing to participate in cooperatives because of a higher level of threat from armed non-state actors (see results from Triad 5 in the section on security). See Annex 4 for gender analysis in Badghis.



Figure 8 - Willingness to join a community cooperative scheme by land tenure

Respondents identified a significant difference in their source of agricultural water with irrigation much more prevalent in Herat than in Badghis. The finding that that most of the respondents at the IDP Site(s) in Herat came from the smaller number of farms that relied on rain-fed water suggests, as perhaps would be expected, that irrigation provides more resilience against drought than reliance on rain which had already been lower than average for a number of years prior to 2018.



Figure 9 - Source of agricultural water by community/IDP Site

[35] Interest in cooperative schemes may have been influenced by the apparent success (or, at least, reach) of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) established/funded by the National Solidarity Programme, now renamed as the Citizens Charter. See overview provided by Centre for Public Impact url The role and potential impact of community-based cooperative schemes is discussed later under the Communities theme.

Only 15% of respondents said that they knew a drought was coming and, of these, most said that they could see it by watching the land. This was more evident in Herat and is probably related to the higher use of irrigation as a source of agricultural water. This data would benefit from further exploration because with the history of droughts in Afghanistan and the lower than average rainfall over the few years prior to 2018, it is difficult to accept that so few people 'knew' that a drought was coming. The issue here may be that the respondents answered the question in relation to the Government's official declaration of drought in April 2018 rather than to the conditions on the ground.



Figure 10 - Knowledge of the drought by community/IDP site

Almost all respondents in Badghis and all respondents in the IDP Site(s) in Herat said that they were poor or very poor compared with the people around them. Poverty seems to be less acute in rural communities in Herat. As would be expected, most of this relative wealth is focused on land owners.



Figure 11 - Wealth by community/IDP site

Theme 1: Security

Security challenges are cited by many respondents as an important factor in leaving their communities. This is supported by the Field Research Team Co-ordinator who said that respondents often described their decision to leave their communities because of problems caused by the drought **on top of** the problems caused by security issues.[36] One without the other may have been manageable, but both together put many families over the tipping point. Addressing Afghanistan's IDP problem requires a clear understanding of security issues.

This section describes two findings: the impact of location on the level and nature of security threats; and the influence of land tenure on the perception of threats. It is based on the responses to Triad 5 as illustrated below.

1. Respondents in Herat were threatened by more actors than respondents in Badghis

Respondents placed a mark in the triangle below to show the source(s) of threat at the time of the experience they had described. 55% of all respondents identified armed non-state actors (ANSA) as their primary threat, 16% identified national security forces and ANSA as their primary threat and 4% assessed these as a lower threat than disputes within their community. The low number in the last of these three groups highlights the prevalence of threat related to conflict and policing but may also suggest the existence of robust intracommunal dispute resolution mechanisms such as local shuras. If the latter is a valid then resilience programs should avoid creating additional local bodies to oversee development because, according to a study carried out in 2013, a proliferation of local Community Development Councils (CDCs) for specific projects can lead to weaker community governance.[37]

Credit: ISAF Media

[36] The IOM Data Tracking Matrix Situation Report provides supporting data (*ibid – footnote 33*)

[37] "Too Much of a Good Thing" - Did local democracy help or hinder post-2001 Afghanistan? Argument, based on an MIT Study, published in Foreign Policy in 2013 url

The results in the separate provinces differ significantly from the overall results. As shown below, in Herat, the top zone included 36% of responses vs 86% in Badghis and the zone between the left and top corners included 19% and 2% respectively. These figures which are reflected in part by differences in data reported in the 2019 Survey of the Afghan National People[38] and suggests that respondents in Herat felt threatened by a wider range of actors than those in Badghis.



Figure 12 - Security in Badghis is more focused on threats from armed non-state actors

Badghis saw much heavier fighting than Herat in 2018.[39] This may suggest that major ANSA activity decreases popular support for them in the target region – or at least, makes them appear to be more of a threat than national security forces. Results explored under the Community theme support this because respondents in Herat had a lower level of faith in government than respondents in Badghis. This suggests that GIRoA and its partners may be able to gain significant increases in popular support by reducing the threat that national security forces pose to civilians and increasing community policing to provide inclusive justice for all communities.

I will go back, even it means I need to live like a snake.

The conflicts were too frequent, every day the Taliban and Afghan National Forces used to clash. One day a warhead fell into the yard of my house and took the life of my 15 years old daughter. I didn't possess land and neither had I any other source of income in my place, I only had a few sheep that were also lost due to drought. I was still happy there as that was my own place but due to the conflicts and instabilities, I couldn't stay there any longer. I will not return to my place until and unless it is properly secured. But if it is secured, I will go back and will live there even if it meant to live like a snake which consumes soil. (Herat, Male, Wage earner, Left & Not yet returned)

[38] Asia Foundation Dashboard url. Multi-select responses to the question "Who do you think poses threat to the security of this local area?" in Herat and Badghis respectively puts Taliban at 62% and 91% and Government, Security Forces and the Police at ~2% and ~5%. However, data for Herat also identified higher threats to security from warlords, smugglers, anti-government elements and unemployed people – all of whom may have pushed our findings away from the top of the triangle.

[39] SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress - April 30, 2019



People killed by dispute caused by the drought

We got to a dispute, due to that we have left our houses and our own place. They have killed three of us and we have killed two from them. I didn't have my own land and cultivated the land of Malik of the village, when the drought hit, and we didn't get crops from the fields. The owner of the land was asking for expenses that he has made on manure and ploughing which I denied paying as it wasn't my fault and I didn't have money either. It was for this issue that our dispute got worse and drew guns at each other. I fled here, I couldn't bring anything along, my houses with all its belongings are left with Malik, he even has taken 5 of my sheep and destroyed my house. (Male, Head of Household, Badghis, T5)

Figure 13 - Selected narratives for Finding 1

2. Respondents at IDP sites or squatting elsewhere without clear title to land were threatened by more actors than other respondents.

The patterns in the Figure 14 show that, in terms of land tenure, respondents who squatted on common or contested land were more likely to feel threatened by both national security forces and ANSA. Detailed analysis, not illustrated here, shows a similar difference between patterns in responses collected at an IDP Site and responses collected in a rural community. These results are bundled together because respondents who squatted and respondents at IDP sites are both marginalised, more vulnerable and have less access to formal services than other groups.[40]



Figure 14 - Squatters feel more threatened by national security forces

[40] More than three quarters of the respondents who identified as 'squatters' were living at an IDP site at the time of collection. This group made up about one third of all respondents living at an IDP site. The overlap between these two groups may explain in part why they have a similar pattern.

As shown above 30% of squatters vs 60% of other respondents identified ANSA as the principal security threat (placing responses in the top zone). This difference is offset by 32% of squatters vs 9% of other respondents placing their response in the left<>top zone indicating threat from national security forces as well as ANSA. As might be expected, squatters also have a slightly higher prevalence of disputes with other people in the community.

Turning to the related difference between respondents at IDP sites (blue dots) and respondents in rural communities (orange dots): detailed analysis shows that 46% of respondents at IDP sites and 59% of respondents in rural communities placed their dots in the top zone indicating that they felt most threatened by ANSA. This contrasts with 24% and 7% respectively in the left<>top zone again highlighting the increased threat of national security forces to respondents who are more vulnerable.

The data noted in the previous paragraph shows that squatters and residents at IDP sites are more likely than other groups to have to cope with security pressures from multiple sources. Having said this, however, it does not suggest that these vulnerable groups are systematically targeted by government forces because, if this was true, it is likely that more of these respondents would have placed their dots in the left zone.

An alternative explanation is that squatters and camp residents have less social standing and capability to engage positively with government forces than other demographics[41] and that those on the fringes of society are more likely to be victimised and suspected of crimes by the police. Also, since the land on which these people are squatting is common or contested land, police are likely to interact with them more frequently than with people who own or rent their own land.

This analysis of squatters and camp residents as social outsiders is also supported by results explored under the Community theme in which we identify that they view formal structures more negatively than their land tenured peers. Moreover, through the stones question about sources of assistance during the during the drought, analysis shows that 63% of squatters and 55% of camp residents received assistance from ANSA. This contrasts with 24% and 17% respectively of other respondents.

A combination of aid from ANSA and threat from government forces may push this group (further) into the ANSA camp, decreasing regional security. A decline in regional security leads to an increase in fighting, which disrupts aid programming, damages the local economy, and increases civilian fear – all reducing community resilience.

[41] This is argued because (1) squatters do not have legal land tenure or, where they are nomadic pastoralists, permanent homes at all, which renders them more precarious; and (2) camp residents fled their homes due to drought and therefore likely had less income/wealth than those who rode out the storm. More research needs to be done to verify these claims.

Cold nights and nothing to feed our children

In past two years, the security conditions have been very bad in our village, there used to be conflicts during any time of the day, we used to run away towards the mountains and hills to save our lives. There we had to spend the night in cold weather under blue sky. I even lost one of my 20-year-old sons in conflicts. Our lives were getting worse day by day, then the drought hit. We had no other option but to move to another place which is around 2 hours away from our original place. There as well, we didn't get any aids or assistance, my children used to suffer from cold and we didn't have money to do their treatment and make them comfortable. We had nothing to feed our children with, we have experienced very difficult days of our lives. (Badghis, Female, Wage earner, Left & returned)

Figure 15 - Selected narrative for Finding 2

See footnote [42]

[42] The narrative included above refers to a wage earner in Badghis rather than a squatter. However, since only a handful of respondents in Badghis identified themselves as squatters we assume that wage earners may include some of the same group and, in this case, the respondent has placed her mark in the triangle halfway between ANSA and national security forces which is where the squatters in Herat have placed their mark. The narrative may be replaced with an alternative provided by a squatter in Herat when the machine translations for additional narratives have been reviewed.

Theme 2: Livelihoods

Ensuring that all Afghans have the means to live with sufficient capacity to absorb the impact of droughts and floods, the ability to adapt to changing circumstances and the psycho-social structures that allow them to maintain hope for a better future[43] are all at the core of resilience.

Livelihoods in a system that is based directly or indirectly on agriculture are predicated by the ability to grow and harvest crops and this, in turn, depends on access to water and an ability to farm in safety. It also requires careful stewardship of the natural environment together with health, education and effective management of urbanisation.

Our research focused on lived experience in a small subset of these issues. Specifically, we considered four points:

- relationship between the lack of water and reasons for internal displacement
- utility of different institutions in helping to support groups with different land tenure to cope with drought
- issues that are shared by all respondents; and
- gender and generational divides on key priorities.

Village in Afghanistan, Near Herat
Credit: George Holton url

[43] Mark Eggerman & Catherine Panter (2010) – see footnote 4 on page 12

Analysis & exploration in this section is based on responses to the following sense-making questions filtered by selected multiple-choice questions.

- Triad 2 - At the time the experience happened, my family were fearful of: the lack of security in rural areas, losing our home and community, and/or water sources drying up or becoming unusable. *See Finding 3 below*
- Stones Canvases 1-3: Difficulty / concern / importance of issues associated with staying on, returning to or preventing return to the respondents land. *See Finding 5 for more detail.*
- Stones Canvas 4: Importance of different sources of assistance. *See Finding 4.*
- Stones Canvas 5: Relevance of different coping mechanisms – whether past, present or both. *See Finding 7*

3. Respondents who had not (yet) returned to their land were less concerned about access to safe water for drinking than those who had already returned.

As shown in Figure 17 below, the availability of water sources appears to be highly important for returnees but not a major issue for prospective returnees.

22% of landowners and renters who either stayed on their land or have already returned identified in Triad 2 that their primary concern at the time of the experience they described was about water sources drying up or becoming unusable. In contrast, this was identified as a primary concern of only 2% of prospective returnee landowners and renters list. At the time of the experience they described (prior to leaving their land) this latter cohort was more concerned about lack of security or concerned equally about all three factors (security, loss of home and community, and lack of water). In some ways this is perhaps not surprising because IDPs whose decision to leave their land may have been 'tipped over' by a lack of security are less likely to be willing (or able) to return.

If many of the most persistent IDPs – those who cannot easily return – did not leave due to water stress, then the resumption of water supply may not help them go back. More research is needed to understand this phenomenon and ensure that it is put into a wider context. This research could include a more detailed mapping of the type and sequence of the decisions made by IDPs before they left their land, activities carried out prior to the drought to conserve water / create irrigation schemes, the proximity of conflict and further narrative research into the character and absorptive and adaptive capacities of the communities from which IDPs came.[44] A key element of this research would be to identify, explore and make effective use of indigenous technical knowledge on water conservation methods so that 'standard' methods are not applied where they are not appropriate.

[44] One of the case studies in the Literature Review in Annex 6 suggests that these schemes might include digging trenches and dams along slopes to slow the downhill flow of water and encourage it into groundwater recharge, building artificial aquifers (in Afghanistan this could include restoring kareez url) to conserve water and planting naturally occurring fruit tree species. Ground water recharge was encouraged through cheap methods such as soil bunds, semi-circular stone bunds, percolation ponds or check dams.

It may also be helpful to discover what proportion of the squatters (in Herat) who have not yet returned are semi-nomadic pastoralists and thus likely to move to find water (if/where it is available) rather than being concerned about the availability of water at a specific location.

We have returned to our land



We expect to return to our land but have not returned yet



We do not expect to return to our land



Figure 17 - Prospective returnees did not leave exclusively due to concerns over water

I migrated after crops failed but did not receive any aid, so I returned

… I cultivated 30 KG of wheat, but it did not grow. Actually, I had cultivated 2 KG of cumin too, but it was also wasted. For the bread of my children I borrowed 90.000 AFN and sold four goats. Then I tried to go to Iran for work I was denied entry at the border, then I migrated, I stayed there for 7 months but didn't receive any aids there, so I returned back to my own place and still I have no occupation. (Badghis, Male, Landowner, Left & returned)

Drought and instability made us move away.

There was drought in our area, I cultivated wheat and cumin, it seemed like it was planted but later it all parched. I had eight sheep which I sold for 3.000 AFN each, beside that I sold two of my donkeys for 500 and 600 AFN respectively, I borrowed 50.000 AFN and started the business of cumin, I used to buy a KG of Cumin for 2.500 and sell it for 1.200 AFN because I needed cash. I sold half of my lands. Beside the drought hit there were security issues as well in our area, the Taliban used to attack the Security Forces posts every night and our children couldn't sleep because of it, we all were battling for our mental health so we thought it would be better to move in to this place. (Badghis, Male, Landowner, Left & not yet returned)

Figure 16 - Selected Narratives for Finding 3

4. Gender and age are important in determining what aspect of their livelihoods respondents were most concerned about.



Figure 18 - Gender and age influences perception of fears

One of the substantial differences relating to gender or age is in responses to Triad 2 "At the time the experience happened, my family were fearful of …". As shown above 20% of men were primarily or exclusively worried about water sources drying up, while this was only true for 7% of women. Meanwhile, 20% of women were primarily or exclusively worried about losing their home and community, while this was only true for 3% of men.

There is also evidence of a generational divide in priorities, where younger people are more concerned about economic factors such as the water supply while older people place more value on their communities.[45] This is shown in the table opposite. The focus of younger respondents on economic factors is supported by the responses to Triad 3 which asked about the ability of communities to help themselves during the drought. This triad, which is discussed further in the section on Communities, identified that 27% of sons/brothers & sisters/daughters primarily or exclusively believed that access to more income (not from their farms) would help – whereas this was considered most helpful by only 17% of fathers, mothers and grandparents.

	Primarily or exclusively concerned about	
	Losing home & community (Top)	Water sources drying up (Right)
Fathers & mothers	18%	7%
Grandparents	22%	
Sons/daughters etc.	9%	29%

However, the higher interest of younger people in access to more income is not supported by any significant difference in the way that they rated skills and education (in Triad 1) as something that is needed by prospective returnees to move back to their land. This should probably not be taken to

[45] This finding needs to be interpreted with care because younger people may be indirectly concerned about community through concerns about the day-to-day activities and livelihoods of their family

mean that younger people do not value education – but rather that it does not provide immediate practical value.

These results suggest that policies to increase opportunities for non-farming activities for younger people in rural areas might meet with success. However, given the generational divide on the issue, these opportunities would need to be enabled in a way which presents them as complementary to (rather than displacing) traditional community life. Perhaps one option might be to provide state-backed loans repaid by labour on community improvement projects.

5. Informal sources of assistance, including from armed non-state actors, are more important to respondents without land title than to other respondents.

The sources of assistance in the 4th stones canvas question in the signification framework have been grouped, as shown below, into formal and informal sources of assistance. The percentages alongside each source shows the proportion of all respondents that rated the source as ***very*** or ***somewhat important.*** This suggests that while both sources of assistance are important to respondents, formal sources are more important. This is almost certainly influenced by the fact that Government and NGO assistance is generally provided as aid, whereas assistance from other sources is likely to be in the form of loans.

Formal sources of assistance	Informal sources of assistance
• District or provincial government (91%) • NGOs (92%) • Private enterprise/local cooperatives (77%)	• Wider family (63%) • Local Elders (61%) • Malik (32%) • Iman (30%) • Non-state armed actors (21%)

Analysis of the data (not shown) indicates that formal sources of assistance are more important to respondents irrespective of gender, age and land tenure. However, it is noted that informal sources of assistance are more important to respondents who squat on common or contested land than to other respondents and, since most squatters are in Herat, there is a difference by province. This is shown in aggregate in the second chart in Figure 19 below and supported by detail in and Table 3 on the following page.

Formal sources of assistance

District or provincial government, NGOs, and private enterprise/local cooperative



Informal sources of assistance

Wider family, NGO, Non-state armed actors, Local Elders, Iman, and Malik



Figure 19 - Formal sources of assistance are more important than informal sources

How to read a Box & Whisker Chart.

- The ends of the two-tone coloured box are the upper and lower quartiles, so the box spans the inter-quartile range.
- The median (or middle value) is where the box changes colour
- The whiskers are the two lines outside the box. These extend to 1.5 x the inter-quartile range.
- Data points are only shown if they are outside the whiskers (i.e. where they are outliers)

We had to sell our child

During the past two years we suffered from a lot of problems, as the drought hit us, even at a point we had to make the decision of selling our child. Taliban took everything from us and from the other end the drought hit so hard that we lost all our livestock. Then someone helped us and gave us 200.000 and we are still wondering how to pay it back. We even had to beg for food for our other children. (Badghis, Male, Wage Earner, Stayed in Community)

The blue dots show where this respondent placed the stone for each coping mechanism



Figure 20 – Selected narrative for Finding 5

Table 2 - Important sources of assistance for squatters vs other respondents

Selected sources of assistance *Sequenced by size of difference* *Top 5 are all informal sources*	**Very or somewhat important to …**		
	Squatters	**Other respondents**	**Difference**
Non-state armed actors	62%	13%	+49%
Malik	62%	25%	+37%
Iman	66%	29%	+37%
Wider Family	77%	62%	+15%
Local Elders	72%	60%	+12%
Local Cooperative/Private Enterprise	86%	75%	+11%
District or provincial government	81%	92%	-10%
NGO	81%	94%	-13%

Table 3 – Important sources of assistance by province

Selected sources of assistance *Same sequence as above* *Top 5 are all informal sources*	**Very or somewhat important in …**		
	Herat	**Badghis**	**Difference**
Non-state armed actors	36%	8%	-28%
Malik	62%	7%	-55%
Iman	64%	1%	-63%
Wider Family	74%	53%	-21%
Local Elders	67%	52%	-15%
Local Cooperative/Private Enterprise	88%	56%	-32%
District or provincial government	86%	97%	+11%
NGO	89%	96%	+7%

The differences shown above suggest that while most respondents had access to and gained advantages from formal support and institutions, squatters (in Herat) did not have that access, instead turning to informal systems and groups. This phenomenon is well-evidenced in law & order and land adjudication space, with Taliban 'shadow courts' frequently better trusted than official government systems[46]. In times of crisis, it is also plausible that demographic groups without easy access to formal aid would turn to non-state actors, furthering those group's control. It suggests that ***more should be done to expand access to services for squatters, and that further efforts could be taken in building trust between them and the government***. One way that this might be achieved is by reforming the local courts that adjudicate land claims. UNDP's Traditional Justice Program has already identified these courts as the biggest problem faced by local communities – as well as key drivers of corruption.

[46] Land Tenure and Property Rights in Afghanistan - Do LTPR Conflicts And Grievances Foster Support For The Taliban? *Briefing paper prepared by Peter Giampaoli and Safia Aggarwal and published by USAid in January 2010 url*

Addressing this problem may contest a key Taliban advantage and help encourage more people to return to their communities.

The data provided above is supported by findings from the IOM's Data Tracking Matrix Intentions Survey mentioned on page 21 and described in Magenta's Literature Review attached at Annex 6.

6. All respondents had a broadly similar view on coping with issues.

The first three stones canvas questions[47] in the SenseMaker® signification framework asked different groups of respondents to assess a standard list of issues on a scale relevant to their situation.

- Stones Canvas 1 *for people who stayed on their land* - The least/most difficult problems my family faced in staying on our land for the last 2 years were …
- Stones Canvas 2 *for people who left their land and have since returned* - When my family decided to return to our land we were least/most worried about …
- Stones Canvas 3 *for people who left their land and have not yet returned* - When my family decided to move away from our land, our least/most important reasons were …

All three stones canvases asked the relevant group of respondents to assess the following issues:

- Insecurity from armed conflict including coercion by armed groups
- Low income / high debts
- Getting enough fresh water
- Loss of livestock & crops
- Damage to our property
- Problems with other people – particularly on the use of land
- Corrupt local authorities

As illustrated with three of the issues in Figure 21 below, there is little variation across the different groups of respondents in concerns impacting livelihood. This suggests that a family's decision to leave their land temporarily or permanently is not due to catastrophic failure in any one domain, but a build-up of pressure which they lack the assets to deal with.

While focusing resources on one or two areas – such as the provision of safe water for drinking [48] or livestock protection[49] – may increase some aspects of resilience; a more durable approach would be to enhance prosperity and spread good practice so that families have the resources and knowledge to address the whole range of problems associated with or made worse by drought. This approach, based on education and skills-transfer, could be more achievable and cost-effective than separate development projects that address each problem individually. Enabling and encouraging use of multiple mechanisms is likely to be particularly important to families that have had to cope with drought many times before and who are likely to have to do so with increasing frequency in the future.

[47] This refers to the first three questions following the practice question

[48] Tetra Tech Project Brief on Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation in Afghanistan url

[49] USAid Fact Sheet on Livestock value chains in Afghanistan url



Figure 21 - All respondents have similar views on issues

As described in Magenta's Literature Review, it would be helpful to increasing public awareness of cheap and efficient techniques to mitigate the impact of drought.[50] This would need to be achieved through the media, community leaders, local associations and through behaviour change among peer support groups across vulnerable populations. Tribal and religious leaders' awareness and support would encourage behavioural change and leverage the informal sources of assistance that were recognised as important.

While conventional insurance is forbidden by Islamic Religious Law, an alternative referred to as cooperative insurance (or "Takaful" in Arabic), is generally considered to be acceptable.[51] If this cooperative framework could be used in some way to establish a service comparable to the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) set-up by the African Union (AU), it may provide considerable value to GIRoA, NGOs, commercial organisations and individual farmers in Afghanistan. Africa Risk Capacity's value proposition is included in Annex 5 together with a copy of this paragraph to provide context.

[50] See examples of local water management techniques in footnote 44. (*This is on page 34*)

[51] Some religious scholars also object to Takaful but their concerns may be addressed by framing the relationship between the Takaful operator and the ('insured') participants as a business partnership for mutual benefit rather than as commercial purchase of insurance for a premium. See url for discussion of details.

Use of Blanket

We don't have grass for our livestock since many days, we didn't know that drought would also turn out to be a very difficult test of our life. One has to live through hard days too, but we are afraid of instability too. The weather is also very cold these days, we have only one blanket which is used to as curtain of window for privacy during the day and is used to keep us warm during night. (Herat, Male, Landowner, Irrigated, Stayed)

Problems of staying on the land

The blue dots show where this respondent placed the stone for each issue relevant to the experience he had described



They beheaded my boy

My husband was with my children working on their lands when the gunmen came and attacked them, and they beheaded my boy. The whole condition of my life is destroyed. We left all our life behind and came to Herat. Here the only privilege we have is security, nothing else. We don't have a shelter neither food nor cloths. We are living in a very hard situation. (Herat, Female, Left & not yet returned, Squatter)

Reasons for moving

The blue dots show where this respondent placed the stone for each issue relevant to the experience she had described



Back to back misery

First there was only the issue of instability the drought also came. I had to sell my land due to extreme poverty. Then I borrowed money, sold 3 cows and 10 sheep to cope up with the crisis. Then I had to migrate and move to camp. There as well I went through very hard times, I went through hunger and thirst, so I decided to return back to my own place. (Herat, Male, Returned, Landowner)

Barriers to returning

The blue dots show where this respondent placed the stone for each issue relevant to the experience she had described



Figure 22 - Selected narratives for Finding 6

7. Women might be becoming more engaged in coping mechanisms. In addition, non-farming activities may be a more recent coping mechanism in Herat than in Badghis.

The 5th stones canvas questions in the SenseMaker® signification framework asked all respondents to assess each of the coping mechanisms listed below to say when it has been used by their family: in the past, now or both in the past and now.[52]

- Sold household assets such as appliances, furniture, jewelry
- Borrowing money to buy food / relying on others for food
- Sold productive assets like livestock or a plough
- Consumed seed stock
- Sold our house or land
- Support from our community
- Engaging in non-farming activities

The results from this question are shown in the following Box & Whiskers charts. The first three of these charts show the mechanisms by province, gender and by type of respondent. *See page 35 for notes on how to read the charts.*

Figure 23 below shows that the inter-quartile ranges in Herat and Badghis are broadly similar for the first four mechanisms. However, differences in their median values suggests perhaps that ***more respondents borrowed money during this drought than they had in the past*** and that consumption of seed stock was a more recent activity for respondents in Herat than in Badghis. The inter-quartile range for the last two mechanisms have more marked differences between the two provinces. This implies that support from our community and, in particular, ***engaging in non-farming activities is a more recent coping mechanism in Herat than in Badghis***.



Figure 23 - Coping mechanisms by province

[52] We chose this focus following advice from the UNDP Project Manager that the relative importance of different coping mechanisms and the sequence in which they were used were widely researched and known. In hindsight, it would have been helpful if we had also asked the respondents to identify which of the mechanisms they had used to cope with the current drought – either to enable them to stay on their land or to keep them there until they decided to migrate.

Figure 24 below shows that the inter-quartile ranges for male and female respondents differ quite substantially. The difference in the first mechanism, *selling of household assets such as appliances, furniture, jewelry* suggests, perhaps, that women may be more aware of and/or engaged in this activity. Likewise, borrowing money may increasingly be a domestic responsibility – particularly if it is to provide food. This matches the more recent focus amongst women on obtaining support from others in the community.



Figure 24 - Coping mechanisms by gender

The inter-quartile ranges in Figure 25 below are broadly similar across the three types of respondent. The small differences are that those who left and have not yet returned may have made more recent use of the last three mechanisms: sale of house and land, support from community and engaging in non-farming activities. Detailed consideration of the median values also shows some differences – however these are probably not sufficiently large to be significant.



Figure 25 - Coping mechanisms by type of respondent

The narrative provided by many respondents included description of the mechanisms they used to cope with the drought and, for those that left their land, the reason that they left. Two narratives are included below as an example.

All crops failed and money had to be borrowed to pay thieves to release my son

During the past two years there was drought in our area, I personally cultivated 40 KG of wheat, but it all vanished, and I didn't get a single grain from the crops. Beside that I had cultivated 5 KG of cumin too but didn't get anything. I sold 10 sheep for the seed and two cows for the daily expenditure of my household. I sent one of boys to Iran for work, he was captured by thieves on the way and they demanded for money, so I had to send 50.000 AFN to them as well. I was indebted for around 30.000 AFN due to this. (Badghis, Male, Landowner, Stayed)



I am still in debt and am passing the days with no food

Two years ago, I cultivated someone else's land of about 60 KG seed. Out of which 8 KG was barley, 2 KG cumin and 50 KG was wheat, I swear I didn't benefit a single grain. I spent around 20.000 AFN over its ploughing machinery, 10.000 – 12.000 AFN for its manure; since I didn't have money I borrowed all of this, later on for its return I had to sell my livestock, I sold 8 of my sheep and still it wouldn't cover for the whole amount as during the times of drought I sold my sheep for 2.500 AFN only. Then I borrowed 30.000 AFN more from my cousin and moved in here to Sanjitk Camp, I am still in debts and am passing the days with no food. (Badghis, Male, Wage earner, Left & not yet returned)



We have slept in hunger for many nights

A year ago we had nothing to eat, trust me we have slept in hunger for many nights, we used to consume only two meal per day throughout the year, even we ate the grain that we had stocked for seeds, and we didn't have any grain left for seed too. We had to sell our house furniture for just two meals of our household. I sold two of my cows and eighteen sheep for half the actual price, later I got sick and had to sell two Jerib (2000 square meter) of my land for treatment and surgery. (Badghis, Male, Landowner, Left & returned)



Figure 26 - Selected narratives for Finding 7

Table 4 below shows that ***borrowing money, obtaining support from the community and engaging in non-farming activities are approximately twice as frequent now as they were in the past***.[53] If this change is reflected in underlying social norms (as well as being a response to crisis) then it may bring increased flexibility enabling growth of a cash economy alongside the traditional / subsistence economy prevalent in Afghanistan. However, an increase in the cash economy probably runs counter to the cooperative ethos in Islamic societies. Also, unless offset by an increased focus on community support, it might take labour away from mutual community-based activities such as water management and reliance traditional mechanisms for resolving disputes.

Table 4 - Summary data for recently used coping mechanisms

	Past ◄——————————►				**Present**
Borrowing money to buy food / relying on others for food	26%	2%	9%	13%	50%
Support from community	18%	11%	15%	19%	37%
Engaging in non-farming activities	14%	11%	19%	17%	39%

The sale of personal and productive assets, house and land are identified by most respondents as traditional coping mechanisms. While this was expected, the median values are perhaps more focused on the past than is suggested by many of the narratives. One explanation might be that many of the migrants had sold parts of their holdings during previous droughts and, in some cases, had 'moved down' the livelihoods scale from being landowners to renting land to working as wage earners / sharecroppers.

If indeed rural land is being sold[54] , then it could be helpful to find out who is buying it to identify the possibility of consolidation and creation of larger farms that are able to invest in improved irrigation, solar powered generators etc.[55]

[53] The SenseMaker® question did not ask respondents to specify when in the past the coping mechanisms were used; this was intentional use of appropriate ambiguity.

[54] The 2019 Afghan National Survey's finding that data on land ownership was consistent with previous years suggests that sale of land has not been widespread. Also, informal conversations with Afghan citizens suggest that people who are able to do so generally provide loans rather than purchase rural/farming land. This makes sense because if land needs to be sold because it has not been able to support a crop then it is not worth purchasing; whereas if a loan is not repaid then the lender can require payment through sharecropping. This is not, however the case in all contexts and land in urban and peri-urban areas is apparently in demand and is being purchased by development interests for commercial use.

[55] While this might be helpful, the low level of registration of land ownership / land transactions and the prevalence of small holdings of 1-5 jeribs is likely to make it infeasible / uneconomic to track ownership.

Afghan market – Credit: U.S. Army National Guard Photographer Staff Sgt. Russell Lee Klika url

Credit: World Vision International url

Theme 3: Communities

Communities are enshrined in ahadith[56] as a fundamental part of Islamic society. When combined with personal faith and hope[57] they create and sustain resilience to cope with adversity.

The lived experience of communities and of the underlying structure of resilience in coping with slow-onset disaster such as a drought will inevitably feel different to those that apply to fast-onset disasters.[58] In the latter, there is typically a fight-flight response that generates momentum for able members of a community to actively support each other until the situation stabilises. In a slow-onset disaster, the effects are ignored or perhaps 'down-played' through the use coping mechanisms or by belief that everyone must cope with the same situation.[59] This suppresses the ability to take remedial action and thus creates anxiety, depression and learned helplessness.[60]

Our research looks at a narrow segment of the scope described above and explores patterns in data on how respondents relate to cooperative schemes and on who they see as responsible for improving their situation. These patterns are based on responses to the following sense-making questions

- Triad 3 - Our community would have been able to help itself during the drought if it had: Access to more income (not from our farms), A stronger community-based cooperative scheme, and/or leaders [that] helped us prepare better.
- Triad 4 - When our grandchildren grow up, life will be easier because of action taken by: Government, Community Leaders and/or Individual People

The wider scope outlined above would require a ***more detailed map of the landscape of the lived experience of resilience within communities***. If this map were created and connected with a database of community level initiatives it would assist UNDP's in its mandate to serve as an integrator between humanitarian and development agencies, as well as supporting sustainable change***.***

The potential for community-based activity is exemplified by the way that large pistachio forests in Herat and Badghis used to be held in common and managed with traditional communitarian methods based on broad communal consent. Sadly, the lack of alternative sources of firewood/fuel due to conflict and repeated droughts coupled with exploitation, primarily by ANSA, has led to destruction of more than 50% of these forests.[61]

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[56] "A believer to another believer is like a building whose different parts support each other." The Prophet then clasped his hands with the fingers interlaced while saying that." (Bukhari 2446). He also said: "The believers in their mutual kindness, compassion and sympathy are just like one body. When one of the limbs suffers, the whole body responds to it with wakefulness and fever." (Bukhari and Muslim - Book 1, Hadith 224)

[57] Ibid Eggerton & Panter (see footnote 4 on page 6)

[58] No matter of choice: displacement in a changing climate – IDMC thematic paper December 2018 url

[59] Overcoming barriers to proactive response in slow-onset disasters url

[60] Psychological Responses to Drought in Northeastern Brazil – January 2004 url

[61] Badghis Pistachio Forests Face Destruction url The end of the communitarian approach has also been attributed to a Royal decree during the reign of Amanullah Khan which took the Pistachio forests into public ownership.

8. Landowners who had left and returned to their land thought that stronger cooperative schemes would have allowed the community to help itself during the drought more than better preparation by leaders or access to more non-farming income.

Cooperatives are supported by the UN to increase community cohesion and resilience.[62] However, there is a risk that, in some contexts, they could increase structural inequity between landowners, returnees & wage workers and renters, non-returnees & squatters. This is because the activities of cooperatives may allow already comparatively advantaged people to pool resources to increase their capability and resilience – while marginalising less advantaged groups. Further, the way in which cooperatives channel decisions and group purchasing may increase opportunities for corruption.



Figure 27 - Cooperative schemes are of more interest to some groups than others

As illustrated above, 20% of respondents who had stayed on their land or returned to it primarily or exclusively supported the value of stronger community-based cooperative schemes. However, only 8% of those who had left and were yet to return shared this view.[63]

Looking at this data from the perspective of land tenure highlights a similar difference with primary or exclusive support from 19% of landowners and wage workers, 12% of renters but only 3% of squatters. While there is insufficient data to drill down on all combinations of land tenure and status of respondent, one figure that stands out is the 30% primary or exclusive support for cooperatives amongst land owning returnees. The low level of support for cooperatives from squatters may be because they believe they would not be accepted in or supported by a cooperative or, for those that are pastoralists, because they move with their livestock rather than stay in a particular community.

It is important to note, however that these figures represent relative rather than absolute support for community-based cooperative schemes. It is perhaps understandable that respondents who own or

[62] UN-Supported Agricultural Cooperatives Help Change Lives of Women in Badakhshan. See also, the reference UNDP's flagship CCAP programme on the next page

[63] The low number of respondents (55) who said that they were or had been members of a local co-operative prevents any useful analysis of differences in this triad between members and non-members

rent land would provide relatively more support for these schemes than for access to more income from non-farm sources or for more helpful leaders – and that the converse would be true for comparatively disadvantaged respondents, particularly amongst those who have not yet returned to their communities or do not expect to do so.

If policymakers choose to promote the number and scope of community-based cooperative schemes, they should conduct additional, targeted research to understand the impact of land tenure and returnee status. Without this additional information they may risk unfairly advantaging some groups and excluding & further embittering others – an outcome that is clearly ill advised in areas where there is already significant division and conflict.



Figure 28 - Two initiatives from UNDP's Climate Change Adaptation Project (CCAP)

We note that that UNDP's Climate Change Adaptation Project (CCAP)[64] illustrated above has had significant success in the Zindar Jan and Safar Kahn Districts in Herat. Had we been aware of this, it would have been helpful to have assessed if these initiatives had a wider impact on the resilience of other people in nearby communities. The same applies to the wide range of development projects enabled / supported by other development actors or by local funding available through the Citizens Charter ***If further work is carried out to monitor the impact of lived experience on resilience, we recommend that it asks whether and what the respondents know about any local development initiatives.***

64 UNDP's Climate Change Adaptation Project (CCAP) Photobook url

The community dug trenches and dams along slopes to slow the downhill flow of water and encourage it into groundwater recharge, built artificial springs to conserve water and planted naturally occurring fruit tree species to restore biodiversity and improve soil quality. Ground water recharge was encouraged through cheap methods such as soil bunds, semi-circular stone bunds, percolation ponds or check dams. These methods proved effective and allowed the community to become self-sufficient food-wise. The community leader expressed a belief that the key reason for the success was its ability to change mindsets.

Figure 29 - Excerpt from a case study in the literature review in Annex 5

This further work could be targeted specifically to identify communities where local sentiment is positive to change and could therefore undertake a portfolio of small safe-to-fail initiatives.[65] The case study described in Magenta's Literature Review in Annex 6 (and copied below) describes a water management initiative in which the result combined a significant improvement with a change in mindset.

Detailed analysis (not shown here) of the responses to the triad 3 in Figure 27 identifies that 29% of all respondents in Badghis placed their mark in the top zone. This indicates that they thought that a community-based cooperative scheme would have provided significantly more help during the drought than either access to non-farming work or better preparation by leaders. In contrast most of the largest group of respondents in Herat put their mark in the centre zone and only 7% marked the top zone.

Although respondents in Badghis provided stronger relative support for community-based cooperative schemes than respondents in Herat; respondents in Herat were more willing overall to participate in a cooperative scheme. This was identified in the socio-demographic data earlier in the report. One other difference worth noting is that many of the 29% of respondents in Badghis were wage workers whereas the 7% in Herat were primarily landowners and renters.

While there is clear support for community-based cooperative schemes, the Literature Review sounds a note of caution when it reports that IDPs expressed little awareness of alternatives to government aid or improved environment conditions as an opportunity to return to their AoO, suggesting that they either are not aware, or do not believe that community-led initiatives can help them become resilient. This contrary finding may reflect the difference between responses to conventional perceptions research and research based specifically on a narrative account of lived experience – nonetheless it might warrant further exploration and discussion.

[65] See Annex 1 for methodological information on safe-to-fail initiatives

9. Respondents in Badghis relied exclusively on the Government to improve their lives; in Herat, community leaders were expected to share this responsibility



Figure 30 - Respondents in Badghis rely more on the Government to improve their livelihoods

As shown above, 74% of respondents in Badghis said that action by the Government would make their lives easier and when added to the 14% in the right<>left zone and 8% in the centre this accounted for 94% of all responses. Respondents in Herat also showed a 43% reliance on the Government but also expected their community leaders to take an active role. The role of community leaders is a combination of the 18 % in the left<>top zone, the 3% in the top zone plus a share of the 27% in the centre.

The reliance on Government tallies with provincial data collected in Asia Foundation's 2019 Survey of the Afghan People[66] on whether different levels of Government were doing a very good or somewhat good job.



Figure 31 - Illustration of Qanat or Kareez (See also page 31 and footnote 44)

	Very or somewhat good	
	Herat	Badghis
National Government	53%	72%
Provincial Government	58%	67%
Municipal Government	47%	57%
District Government	59%	48%

The question here that may need additional research is whether our respondents think government *should help them* or that it *will help them* and, in both cases, whether they trust it to do so. If these additional questions could be asked and answered on the basis of lived experience it would test whether the results due to a genuine enthusiasm for government, or a resignation that it is the only actor with sufficient resources to change anything.

It is also possible that there may be an inferential link between the stronger reliance on Government in Badghis and the higher level of ANSA activity that it has experienced.

The picture gets more complicated when using detailed analysis, not illustrated here, to account for the impact of returnee status and land tenure.

Actual returnees across all land tenure states are at 57% in the left zone. Prospective returnees are at 61%, and those who do not intend to return are at 49%. This suggests that there are higher hopes for government action among those who want to go home, but that they are somewhat let down when they see the actual extent of government support. Further exploration may be helpful to discover whether and to what extent the people returning to their communities are given assistance that is valued and sustained.

Moving to land tenure, belief in the Government is higher at 71% amongst respondents who are wage workers than among landowners at 53%, renters at 48%, and squatters at 40%. This is potentially indicative of the growing rural-urban divide in Afghanistan[67], with urban wage workers increasingly benefiting from government programs while rural areas decay. Implementing a program to sustainably transition rural workers – especially squatters – towards wage work in rural areas may therefore pay dividends in support for government. ***Where this program tests new ideas, they should be designed as safe-to-fail initiatives[68] and managed in an adaptive way; this experimental approach is essential in complex situations.***

Understanding may also be increased combining a narrative-based assessment of lived experience with the collection of related quantitative data (based on observations and facts on the ground) to help chart how government has positively or negatively impacted respondents in different sectors. It is also recommended that any future COVID-safe collection of SenseMaker® data is supplemented by a journal kept by the enumerator of points made during conversation (if any) after collection of the narrative and responses to the sense-making questions.

[67] The Price Of Inequality: The Dangerous Rural-Urban Divide In Afghanistan - Global Security Review (June 2019) url

[68] See Annex 1 for methodological information on safe-to-fail initiatives

10. Female respondents in Herat lose faith in government upon returning to their land, whereas male respondents gain faith.



Figure 32 - Female respondents expect community leaders to help improve their lives

Triad 4 features a sharp gender divide in terms of faith in government in Herat. 52% of men responded in the left zone, but this was true of just 33% of women.[69] This picture is made even starker when analysing the phenomenon through the lens of returnee status.

Percentage of respondents in left zone	Herati men	Herati women	Difference between men and women
Stayed	58%	27%	31 pp
Left and returned	62%	33%	29 pp
Left and not yet returned	44%	37%	7 pp

This data suggests that both men and women who left and have yet to return have a similar, lower faith in government. However, when IDPs return to their communities, men's faith in government increases significantly while women's faith in government falls. This dynamic can also be seen in those who stayed on their land throughout.

It is difficult to draw strong explanations for this finding given that the survey used gender as a filter rather than including gender specific questions. However, the results suggest that government relief schemes and service provision for stayers and returnees in Herat may strongly advantage men over women. We believe this is a key problem which should be addressed as soon as is practicable to ensure that resilience programming is not entrenching gender inequality.

[69] In Badghis, the divide is 70% of men and 77% of women, without significant variation by returnee status.

Summary of Key Findings

This section of the report summarises the 10 key findings from the research that were presented and discussed in the Analysis, Exploration and Discussion of Results section starting on page 19. It also summarises general findings based on the number and profile of respondents.

Theme 1: Security

1. Respondents in Herat were threatened by more actors than respondents in Badghis.

A majority of the respondents in Badghis felt that armed-non state actors were the most important threat to their security, while the Herati population is more equivocal, with many labelling both security forces and armed non-state actors as significant threats.

2. Respondents at IDP sites or squatting elsewhere without clear title to land were threatened by more actors than other respondents.

Respondents living in IDP sites or squatting elsewhere are threatened by both armed non-state actors and national security forces. It does not appear that they are systematically targeted by security forces, as few respondents named security forces as a primary of source of threat. It is possible that this finding arises instead from a lack of social standing and marginalisation.

Theme 2: Livelihoods

3. Respondents who had not (yet) returned to their land were less concerned about access to safe water for drinking than those who had already returned.

Respondents who stayed on their land or left and returned were very worried about ensuring access to water, while non-returnees were markedly less concerned. This suggests that while access to water may be necessary to encourage people to return to their communities, it is not sufficient on its own.

4. Gender and age are important in determining what aspect of their livelihoods respondents were most concerned about.

Men appear to be more worried about the 'economic' concern of losing water, while women are more concerned with losing their place in the community. Interestingly, however, younger men and women are uniformly more worried about than communities. This may suggest that they have less attachment to communities and more interest in economic factors.

5. Informal sources of assistance, including from armed non-state actors, are more important to respondents without land title than to other respondents.

All respondents felt that formal sources of assistance were important in helping them cope with the drought. However, squatters were significantly more likely to draw upon additional aid from informal sources such as their wider family, Local Elders, Iman and Malik. Notably these informal sources also include armed non-state actors.

6. All respondents had a broadly similar view on coping with issues.

Irrespective of their return status, all respondents had a similar view of the challenges brought on by the drought and felt that all challenges were of similar importance. This suggests that leaving and returning might be the result of a build-up of stresses across the board rather than failure to cope with a single problem. This in turn militates for a resilience strategy that addresses many concerns.

7. Women might be becoming more engaged in coping mechanisms. In addition, non-farming activities may be a more recent coping mechanism in Herat than in Badghis.

Respondents borrowed money twice as frequently in this drought as in the past. This behaviour may be contributing to the growth of the cash economy. However, coupled with the apparently increasing involvement of women and families in coping mechanisms, this change may run counter to the traditional Islamic ethos in Afghanistan.

Theme 3 - Communities

8. Landowners who had left and returned to their land thought that stronger cooperative schemes would have allowed the community to help itself during the drought more than better preparation by leaders or access to more non-farming income.

Landowners, wage workers, and renters who left and returned to their land – or indeed stayed throughout the drought – are confident in cooperative schemes as ways to build resilience. However, squatters lack confidence in this system; and may even be concerned that it will unfairly disadvantage them.

9. Respondents in Badghis relied exclusively on the Government to improve their lives; in Herat, community leaders were expected to share this responsibility

The largest share of responses in both provinces indicate that government is the primary actor in improving lives. However, respondents in Badghis have a higher belief than respondents in Herat in the potential positive impact of government. Within this, wage workers have a much higher faith in government than other demographics.

10. Female respondents in Herat lose faith in government upon returning to their land, whereas male respondents gain faith.

In Herat, female respondents are less likely than male respondents to believe that government will make their lives better. This is particularly pronounced for women who have returned to their land; faith in government amongst these respondents declines 10 percentage points on returning to their land, whereas the faith in government of male respondents rises by 20 points.

General findings based on number and profile of respondents

- Responses were collected from 1,327 respondents: 61% in Herat and 39% in Badghis.
- Responses were collected from 5 communities in rural districts and from 4 IDP Sites. The 5 rural communities were Injil and Guzarah in Herat and Qalah'ye-Naw, Maqur and Ab-e- Kamini in Badghis. The 4 IDP Sites were Sharak-e-Sabz and Shaidayee in Herat and Sanjitak and Kharistan in Badghis. 845 responses were collected in rural communities and 482 responses were collected at IDP Sites.
- Responses in all settings were split approximately 50:50 by gender.

- **Of the 845 responses collected in the rural communities, 55% were from respondents that had stayed in their communities** throughout the drought and the remaining **45% were from respondents who had migrated from and then later returned to their communities**.
- **67% of the 482 respondents at IDP Sites did not expect to return to their communities in the future**.
- Approximately 58% of the respondents in both provinces said they owned or rented their land, 15% said they squatted on common or contested land ('squatters') and 27% said that they were wage workers (or did not specify a form of land tenure)
- Most of the respondents who said they were squatters were in Herat; very few of the respondents in Badghis said they were squatters. This may be offset by the presence of many more wage workers among the respondents in Badghis than in Herat.
- Most of the respondents in Badghis who did not expect to return to their land are wage workers
- Few respondents currently participate in local community-based cooperative schemes. However, most respondents were willing or very willing to participate in these schemes. This was more evident in Herat than in Badghis
- Most of the irrigated land was in Herat. Almost all respondents in Badghis lived on, or had migrated from, rain-fed land.
- Respondents living on irrigated land in Herat appeared to be more able to cope more effectively with the drought. This was shown by the finding that most of the respondents at IDP Sites in Herat came from rain-fed lands.
- Relatively few respondents said that they knew a drought was coming and, of these, most said that they could see it by watching the land. However, this knowledge may have been of the Government's official declaration of the drought rather than the fact of the drought.

Recommendations

This section of the report sets out our recommendations based on the findings of the research.

To better navigate the complex human terrain of Herat and Badghis and deliver effective development and resilience programming, **UNDP Afghanistan should work with humanitarian agencies, NGOs and GIRoA to**:

1. **Identify and map differences between IDPs who have returned to their land and those who have not; and use this data to create new insights that can help increase returns and resilience.** These differences between different groups of IDPs should include how close their communities have been to local armed conflict, their current and past access to clean water and the past productivity of their land. Create an electronic map that shows this data overlaid on communities/areas of farmland where respondents have stayed, returned or not yet returned. Animate the map to show changes over time and analyse patterns and changes to gain new insight into the reasons that some people are able and willing to return whereas others are not. Also, use this analysis, together with more focused research on lived experience to identify residual absorptive capacity and evidence of adaptive capacity. Combine the output from this additional research to inform cross-sectoral programming to encourage more people to return to rural communities, underpin the development of local cooperatives and rebuild/strengthen resilience. *This recommendation is based on the finding from the survey that those who stayed on their land or returned to it are more worried than non-returnees about water scarcity and security as well as on wider findings related to faith in government and support for community-based cooperatives*.

2. **Examine the impact of ANSA activity, rural-urban divide and gender on faith in government to confirm that it is being used to greatest effect.** The results reported here suggest that most respondents believe that life in the future will be easier because of action taken by the government rather than by community leaders or by individual people. This is framed as *faith in government* – although it could perhaps equally be seen as *reliance on government* – and is consistent with the results reported in the 2019 National Survey of Afghan People. However, the findings include a number of anomalies that would benefit from further examination to mitigate the risk of potential difficulties. First, higher ANSA activity in Badghis appears to be correlated with higher faith in government; this is unusual. Second, faith in government is higher amongst wage workers than other respondents - and hence people transitioning from the subsistence economy to the cash economy and from rural to urban occupations may have higher expectations. Third, male respondents who stayed on their land or returned to it have significantly higher faith in government than female respondents in the same cohort – one possible explanation for this anomaly might be that women have a more substantive role during crises and chafe at a return to traditional gender roles endorsed by the government. Research carried out to implement this recommendation could also establish whether people relied on the government to make an official announcement about the drought before they recognised or accepted that one was coming; and if this was the case, what it implies for faith in the government.

3. **Review programming to confirm it addresses gender-specific differences in perceptions about the impact of drought and conflict and differences in generational priorities about livelihoods:** *This recommendation is based on two findings in the survey. First that men are more worried*

about having access to safe water for drinking and for agriculture, while women are more worried about losing their community. Second *that younger Afghans are more likely to be concerned about economic issues like water scarcity and will want to seek paid work – while older Afghans are more worried about losing their communities*. *It is noted however in relation to the second finding that the survey did not collect information about indirect concerns that younger people may have about their communities through concerns about the day-to-day activities and livelihoods of their family.*

4. **Investigate the impact of land tenure on sources of risk and assistance** to identify action that can be taken, if necessary, to reduce victimisation – even if it is unconscious – of marginalised groups by the Government and to counter the influence of armed non-state actors. This investigation may also enable assistance to be used more effectively to build or strengthen absorptive or adaptive capacity to withstand the next drought as well to meet immediate needs. *This recommendation is based on two findings from the survey. First that respondents living in IDP camps and other respondents who are squatting without land title feel threatened by both ANSA and security forces, whereas respondents with land tenure living in their own communities only feel threatened by ANSA. Second and perhaps counter-intuitively, that those without land title are significantly more likely to rely on informal sources of assistance, including from armed non-state actors.*

5. **Address concerns that local cooperative schemes may adversely impact people who do not have land title.** This survey, along with other development work, suggests that cooperatives can be useful tools for enhancing community resilience. However, it appears that those without land title do not believe that cooperatives will benefit them; and may even adversely impact them. Given the utility of cooperatives, it is important that more research be done on this issue so that UNDP and its partners can effectively implement cooperative schemes without underserving or increasing hostility among a potentially marginalised population. As part of this work, it would be helpful for further research to be carried out to confirm what different groups of people understand by the term cooperative and what their experience of cooperatives might have been in the past.

6. **Create and maintain a website that provides a consolidated, up to date and categorised list of all current and completed community development projects.** This website would provide increased visibility of and access to the wide range of local projects that have been completed or are being carried out. It would also provide context for more specific future surveys of the impact of development programming on lived experience of, and resilience to, continued conflict and future droughts, floods and other disasters resulting from natural hazards. Ideally this website would be connected or integrated with the map recommended above and with the Afghanistan Hydromet & Early Warning Services for Resilience that is currently being constructed. url

7. **Identify and support cross-sectoral local community development activities to strengthen resilience, regain self-reliance and provide an alternative to urbanisation**. These activities should build absorptive and adaptive capacity by focusing on cooperative schemes to provide sustainable water management and introduce new crops that are more drought resistant. They could also test the feasibility and value of cooperative (takaful) insurance for drought as outlined in Annex 6.

Annexes

Annex 1: SenseMaker & Cynefin

SenseMaker® is online software that allows respondents to describe a lived experience and then signify what the experience means to them in their own context. This process of 'self-signification' allows unprepared narratives to be collected in a quantitative framework that can be mapped, analysed, and explored on a near real-time basis. A brief explanation of key aspects of the process is provided below together with some illustrations from the project documented in this report.

Narratives

Narratives are provided in response to an open-ended prompting question that is carefully crafted to provide a wide-angle lens through which the respondent can recall and describe a lived experience that is relevant to the enquiry. The prompting question typically includes positive and negative options to avoid biasing the respondent (to provide one or the other); it also highlights the need for the description to be about a specific experience rather than a wish list, an evaluation or a general comment. *(An example is included below for illustration)*

Tell us about something that happened to you or your family in the last 2 years that had a big impact on your ability to live on your land

This can be a good or bad experience, but it must be true and something that happened at a particular time. If your family moved away from your land, the real-life experience must have happened before you moved.

Unprepared narratives are typically more authentic and a stronger indicator of future action than a prepared story that has been 'constructed' through rehearsal and rationalisation.

Anonymity

Respondents are almost always asked to describe their narratives in a way that that can not be used to identify who they are or identify any other individual (except, perhaps, for public figures). Regardless of the anonymity, respondents should also be asked whether their narrative can be shared in the results alongside the signified data.

Self-signification

Self-signification is straight-forward and can be completed by people with a low-level of literacy and/or no formal education It involves respondents keeping in mind the experience they described and then answering a small number of pre-defined visual sense-making questions. These questions are answered by placing a marker between labels at the corners, edges or ends of a shape or line. Most respondents understand what they need to do – and how to do it – by seeing an example and trying a practice question. This can be easily supported using GIF images and/or short videos.

The labels in each question are carefully selected values or attributes that are expected to pull/push the respondent's experience towards/away from them. The labels must be able to be blended with



Example: Results from one of the triads in this project

each other so that the marker can be placed between them to show the relative importance of one label compared with the other label(s). This is also referred to as the 'centre of gravity' of the labels. A useful metaphor is to the labels as all positive or all negative magnets – that are of different strengths for each respondent - and the narrative as the magnetic object in the middle of them.

The questions and labels are referred to as a signification framework and are designed or modified for each separate area of enquiry. Designing signification framework(s) requires careful consideration, iteration and testing of alternative questions and labels and is usually an emergent/organic process rather than scientific.

To avoid bias (e.g. gifting and gaming) the labels need to be all positive, neutral, or negative and need to avoid any value or attribute that is obviously right or wrong. To aid clarity and quick comprehension, questions and labels must be provided in everyday conversational language for the intended respondents rather than in precise and/or professional language.

The respondent's decision on where to place the marker in each question is usually intuitive and, in high quality frameworks, involves a novel rather than autonomic choice. This means that respondents need to think briefly about how to balance the labels in relation to their experience rather than automatically or instinctively deciding they know the right, expected, or expedient answer. Respondents must not be guided or biased in deciding where to place their markers. If they think that a label could be interpreted in different ways, they should be encouraged to make their own choice on which interpretation to choose. The key here is to remind them that there are no right or wrong answers, just their answer! The process of signification adds layers of meaning to the experience that was described in the narrative and provides access to the respondent's deeper lived experience. This is illustrated in the Iceberg Model shown opposite.[70]



The Iceberg Model

[70] Adapted from The Iceberg Model by M. Goodman, 2002. For more information see https://systemsinnovation.io/iceberg-model/

Respondents are not usually asked to explain why they have placed their marker in a particular position; however, if it is appropriate to ask for this explanation, it must be asked after all the questions have been answered. Enquiring too early interrupts the signification process and changes the answers from being intuitive and authentic to being rationalised and constructed.

Data Collection, Quality Assurance, Analysis & Exploration

Respondents input their data to SenseMaker® Collector. This is available on web browsers and as an iOS and Android app. The mobile apps are helpful because they can be used off-line where there is intermittent connectivity to the internet.

Once the data has been input, it is submitted to a central server for near real-time review and for quality assurance based on heuristics.

When sufficient data has been collected and submitted to the central server, key findings and visualisations can be identified and made available for 'second-order sense-making' by a group of people who have local knowledge and relevant subject matter expertise. This sense-making process is required to identify insights that can inform adaptive management of existing and new 'safe-to-fail' initiatives required for effective change in complex systems.

Cynefin Framework

The Cynefin Leaders Framework for Decision Making ("Cynefin Framework") was first described in 2007 in an article published in the Harvard Business Review[71]: since then it has been adopted by many organisations and is widely-cited. It is a sense-making framework that allows decision-makers to separate different types of issue according the applicable level of constraint and to choose a relevant and effective way to respond. While the framework can be used in a static way to identify different contexts and types of decision, it is best used in a dynamic way to track changes over time in the context for particular issue – or bundle of issues.

[71] https://hbr.org/2007/11/a-leaders-framework-for-decision-making. The framework was originated by a group of people including David Snowden. David is the founder and Chief Scientist of Cognitive-Edge which has developed and licenses SenseMaker®

The framework identifies 4 primary contexts or domains - clear, complicated, complex and chaotic – a central domain of two types of confusion and a sub-domain of liminal complexity. This is illustrated opposite with a few key words in each domain. This version of the framework, is described clearly with a COVID-19 example at http://www.chriscorrigan.com/parkinglot/a-tour-around-the-latest-cynefin-iteration/

The Cynefin Framework is relevant here because it underpins the use of SenseMaker® which is specifically intended to be used in the Complex domain. This is shown in the following diagram created by ThinkClarity to illustrate application of an earlier version of the Cynefin Framework[72] to Law & Order Reform.



Cynefin Framework with domains created by Cognitive Edge / David Snowden and used under Creative Commons Licence. Addition of water images, themes and examples of activities/ challenges in each domain © ThinkClarity(2018)

The Cynefin Framework argues that decisions and actions are effective if they use methods aligned with the appropriate context. These methods are outlined below for each of the four main domains in the framework.

- In the **clear domain**, decisions and actions are primarily concerned with control and with identifying and removing measurable variance from 'best-practice' standards. These are decisions and actions are best embedded in the process and/or taken as close in time and place to the performance being controlled. There is a direct, known and predictable relationship between cause and effect – so testing, calibration and remedial action is typically straight-forward. Unless a situation has been allowed to get out of control (or is pushed out of control without becoming chaotic) it generally requires frequent small adjustments. The clear domain typically includes operational and regular administrative activities in industrial and service sector organisations.

[72] In this earlier version of the Cynefin Framework, the "Clear" domain is called "Obvious", "Confusion" is called "Uncertainty" and the sub-domain of liminal complexity is not shown

- In the **complicated domain** decisions and actions are primarily concerned with judgement and with identifying and evaluating options, preparing plans, continuous scanning and appraisal of environmental factors and monitoring and managing performance. Projects to deliver outcomes and/or implement change are planned to make effective use of resources, coordinate action, ensure clear communication and mitigate the risk of failure. This is essential in large-scale projects where the cost of failure is generally high. It is usually assumed that actions are known or knowable and can be implemented, monitored and measured in a controlled environment. Further, policies and constraints are applied to identify what are considered to be good practices (i.e. practice that mitigates manageable risk) and to rule out poor or unacceptable practice. While creativity and innovation can be encouraged in this domain, it is usually constrained by existing priorities and expectations, by the requirement for formal evidence and by a preference for the top-down views of experts. The complicated domain typically includes formulation of policy, strategy, plans and processes alongside conventional research, information management, evaluation and performance management.
- In the **complex domain** decisions and actions are emergent and exploratory rather than instrumental. While there is a relationship between cause and effect, it is not predictable beyond the anticipated reaction of those on whom the action has a direct and immediate impact. Effects are more likely to result from interactions that are displaced in time and place and that involve the past, present and anticipated future effects of other actions, constraints and expectations. The lack of predictability means that actions are more likely to fail than to succeed and, paradoxically, the more planned (and hence structured) an action, the more it is likely to fail. The complex domain typically includes all (aspects of) situations that are primarily socio-political and/or based on how people (and their identities and cultures) interact and negotiate changes to the constraints (e.g. rules) within which they act. Most activities in international development are complex.
- In the **chaotic domain** decisions and actions are generally taken by a single leader who has or takes on executive authority. If relevant contingencies have been prepared, chaos is likely to be short-lived – however, if there are no contingencies and an effective leader does not step-up, the dysfunctional impact of chaos is likely to be an existential threat.

Safe-to-fail initiatives in the complex domain

The high-level of failure of change in the complex domain, described above, means that the actions in this domain must be designed to be 'safe-to-fail' and must also be managed in an adaptive way that allows rapid modification. The following bullet points outline key features of initiatives that are safe-to fail.

- ***Projects/changes are more likely to be safe-to-fail if they are small, locally owned and agile***.[73] These are better referred to as initiatives because they are often ('micro-projects) that are set-up 'over-night' and completed in a 1-3-month period without the structures required for formal projects. Each initiative should only require a minimum upfront investment to avoid the requirement for approval procedures and reduce the risk that it would be used to obtain funds for other purposes.

[73] While it is not impossible for large-scale projects/changes to be 'safe-to-fail' – this would require a highly regarded leader with formal authority to act quickly, informal authority to secure acceptance, the capacity to write-off substantial investment and the ability to mitigate significant social and political risks.

- ***Safe-to-fail initiatives should be implemented in groups so that they can explore different possible ways forward;*** some of these initiatives should intentionally explore oblique ideas to see if they catalyse a desired change.
- ***Portfolios of safe-to-fail initiatives should be monitored continuously*** so that those that are succeeding can be amplified (e.g. by giving them more resource) and those that are failing, or not making sufficient progress, dampened, redirected or stopped. New initiatives need to be added on a regular basis to maintain energy and momentum.
- At the end of an initial period, the impact of the initiatives needs to be reviewed by local sponsors and the people directly involved. The aim of this review is to decide if exploratory and emergent change created by any of the initiatives has started to 'stabilise' (i.e. a repeatable relationship between cause and effect has started to emerge). In these cases, the initiative can be scaled-up in situ and/or replicated in different places with similar starting conditions. Eventually, the scaled-up and/or replicated initiative can grow into a large-scale activity that is 'moved' to the complicated domain to add policies, plans and procedures for its wider implementation as good practice

Annex 2: SenseMaker® Signification Framework

Drought & Security in Western Afghanistan

SenseMaker® Signification Framework
for UNDP Research and Programme Development Project - PIP
Building Back Better: Making Sense of Drought and Resilience in Afghanistan

Draft 12c - 13th October 2019

Enumerator: Please type the next number from your control sheet in to the following box

This page provides high-level notes on the purpose for which SenseMaker® is being used and on the way that the signification framework has been designed. It is not part of the framework and will not be visible in SenseMaker® Collector.

As the direct impact of the drought, over 4 million people are currently struggling with access to water, food, essential resources for their livestock and other necessary sources of livelihoods and income generation. Based on existing data, affected population in over 20 provinces across Afghanistan are becoming severely food insecure, and in desperate need of life-saving humanitarian assistance in the coming months. In combination with other present shocks such as conflict or exposure to natural disasters, nearly 40% of the Afghan population has significant or even extreme food consumption gaps. This is having an irreversible impact on livelihood assets and increasing the prevalence of acute malnutrition.

Apart from the immediate humanitarian needs, it is important to further anticipate the necessary recovery assistance to rebuild the affected population's livelihoods and sources of income. Adapting negative coping mechanisms – livestock destocking, depletion of seed stocks, debts, etc. – have severely reduced the abilities of affected households to eventually recover. In addition, natural and physical capital was severely impacted, such as the availability of grazeland, soil quality (fertility and absorption rates) and reducing the water table.

The signification framework specified here for final review will be used to collect, map and explore ethnographic data to complement existing data and assessments on the impact of drought and security issues on the viability of farming in Western Afghanistan. The major symptom and humanitarian consequence of these drought and security issues combined has been displacement and the concomitant humanitarian case load that has produced.

The framework designed for this work has more specificity than is usually the case and focuses on the facts consequences and mitigation of the drought and security challenges. The data gathered will not only provide qualitative research on what happened in Western Afghanistan but will also provide an approximate model/simulation of what could happen in Western Afghanistan Provinces if an uncontrolled population movement of return were to happen as a result of a peace process in 2019/2020.

Has your family moved away from your land in the last 2 years?

Select ONE of the following.

- ☐ Yes, we moved away from our land in the last 2 years
- ☐ We talked seriously about moving and then decided to stay
- ☐ No, we stayed on our land and have not talked seriously about moving

If your family moved away from your land in the last 2 years …

Select ONE of the following.

- ☐ We have returned to our land
- ☐ Some of us visit our land routinely to keep our property safe
- ☐ We expect to return to our land but have not returned yet
- ☐ We do not expect to return to our land

- ☐ N/A

Your response to this research will be anonymous if you do not say anything that can be used to identify you.

Tell us about something that happened to you or your family in the last 2 years that had a big impact on your ability to live on your land

This can be a good or bad experience, but it must be true and something that happened at a particular time. If your family moved away from your land, the real life experience must have happened before you moved.

Enumerator: If you are not audio-recording the respondent's experience, please type it in the following box

Enumerator: Please ask the respondent to say what their experience is about in a few words and type it below. If this is difficult, please suggest a title to them.

Practice Triad: The last time I attended a family gathering, its success or otherwise was due to the…

Place the marker on the triangle where it shows the relative strength of the labels at each of the corners in how you respond to a typical family gathering. The closer the marker is to a corner, the stronger that corner is relative to the other corners.

N/A ☐





ONLY FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM THEIR LAND:

I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

To move back to our land and rebuild our lives, my family need …

N/A ☐



I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

At the time the experience happened – my family were fearful of …



I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

Our community would have been able to help itself during the drought if it had …



I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

When our grandchildren grow up, life will be easier because of action taken by …



I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

At the time the experience happened, threats to my family's security came from …



Practice Stones: What was important the last time I attended a successful family gathering?

Place each relevant stone in the blue area to answer the question from your own experience of a typical family gathering. Any stones that are not relevant should be left alone.

1
2
3
4
5

Most important ⟷ Least important

1 = The place

2 = Other people

3 = The food

4 = Inviting the Provincial Governor

5 = The time it takes to prepare

N/A ☐

ONLY FOR PEOPLE WHO STAYED ON THEIR LAND FOR THE LAST 2 YEARS

I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

The problems my family faced in staying on our land for the last 2 years were …

Place the stones for each of the problems in the blue area to show which were most difficult and which were less or least difficult. Stones for any problems that were not relevant to your family should be left alone.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Most difficult ⟷ Least difficult

1 = Insecurity from armed conflict - including coercion by armed groups

2 = Getting enough income / paying off debts

3 = Getting enough fresh water

4 = Keeping livestock healthy / crops growing

5 = Damage to our property

6 = Problems with other people - particularly on use of land

7 = Corrupt local authorities

N/A ☐

ONLY FOR PEOPLE WHOSE FAMILY MOVED AWAY FROM THEIR LAND IN THE LAST 2 YEARS AND HAVE SINCE RETURNED:

I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

When my family decided to return to our land we were worried about …

Place the stones for each of the concerns in the blue area to show which you were most worried about and which were less or least worried about. Stones for any concerns that were not relevant to your family should be left alone.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Most worried about ← → Least worried about

1 = Insecurity from armed conflict - including coercion by armed groups

2 = Getting enough income / paying off debts

3 = Getting enough fresh water

4 = Getting new livestock / planting new crops

5 = Damage to our property

6 = Problems with other people - particularly on use of land

7 = Corrupt local authorities

N/A ☐

ONLY FOR PEOPLE WHOSE FAMILY MOVED FROM THEIR LAND IN THE LAST 2 YEARS AND HAVE NOT YET RETURNED:

I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

When my family decided to move away from our land, our reasons were …

Place the stones for each of the reasons in the blue area to show which were most important in your family's decision and which were less or least important. Stones for any reasons that were not relevant to your decision should be left alone.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Most important ← → Least important

1 = Insecurity from armed conflict - including coercion by armed groups

2 = Low income / high debts

3 = Getting enough fresh water

4 = Loss of livestock / crops

5 = Damage to our property

6 = Problems with other people - particularly on use of land

7 = Corrupt local authorities

N/A ☐

I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

At the time the experience happened, my family needed assistance from …

Place the stones for each of the sources of assistance in the blue area to show which were most important to your family's ability to live on your land and which were less or least important. Stones that were not relevant should be left alone.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Very important ⟷ Not important

1 = Our wider family

2 = Local cooperative/private enterprise

3 = District or provincial government

4 = NGO

5 = Non-state armed actors

6 = Local Elders / Shura / CDC

7 = Iman

8 = Malik

N/A ☐

I am keeping in mind the true experience I described

The coping mechanisms for drought my family have used in the past and / or are using today are …

Place the stone for reach relevant coping mechanism on the timeline in the blue area. Stones for any mechanisms that are not relevant should be left alone.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Used now ⟷ Both ⟷ Used in the past

1 = Sold household assets such as appliances, furniture, jewelry

2 = Borrowing money to buy food / relying on others for food

3 = Sold productive assets like livestock or a plough

4 = Consumed seed stock

5 = Sold our house or land

6 = Support from our community

7 = Engaging in non-farming activities

N/A ☐

My family are members of an existing community-based co-operative scheme

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Prefer not to say

I would be willing to participate in a community-based cooperative scheme

If you answered "Yes" to Q13, answer N/A
If you answered "No" to Q13, select ONE of the following.

- ☐ Very willing
- ☐ Willing
- ☐ Neither willing or unwilling
- ☐ Unwilling
- ☐ Very unwilling

Land tenure

Select ONE of the following. If you have more than one sort of land tenure, choose the one that is most important to you.

- ☐ I own my land
- ☐ I rent the land
- ☐ I am a squatter
- ☐ I have land tenure, but it is contested
- ☐ The owner of the land is unknown
- ☐ I live on common land
- ☐ I live on pasture land that is held in common
- ☐ None of the above

The agricultural water source I use on my land is …

Select ONE of the following. If you use both sources, choose the one that is most important to you

- ☐ Irrigated
- ☐ Rain-fed

Did my family know that a drought was coming? If so, how did we find out?

Select ONE of the following.

- ☐ We did not know a drought was coming
- ☐ We were told by an extension worker
- ☐ We were told by friends and neighbours
- ☐ We could see it by watching the land
- ☐ We heard about it on the news/radio

Gender

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

Age

Select ONE of the following

- ☐ Under working age
- ☐ Of working age
- ☐ Too old to work
- ☐ Prefer not to say

Number of adults / children in my family who are able to work

Please include yourself if you are in this group

- ☐ 0
- ☐ 1
- ☐ 2
- ☐ 3
- ☐ 4
- ☐ 5
- ☐ More than 5

Number of adults / children in my family who are not able to work

Please include yourself if you are in this group

- ☐ 0
- ☐ 1
- ☐ 2
- ☐ 3
- ☐ 4
- ☐ 5
- ☐ More than 5

In my family group, I am …

Select ONE of the following in connection with your immediate family. If you have more than one of the these roles in your family, choose the role that is most important to you.

- ☐ Head of the family
- ☐ Father / Mother
- ☐ Grandparent
- ☐ Son / Brother
- ☐ Daughter / Sister
- ☐ Husband / Wife (without children)
- ☐ I am not living in a family group
- ☐ I do not have an immediate family
- ☐ Prefer not to say

Compared with other people where I live, my family is …

Select ONE of the following

- ☐ Rich
- ☐ Average
- ☐ Poor
- ☐ Very poor
- ☐ Prefer not to say

Annex 3: Construction of sample

The SenseMaker® data was collected from a purposive sample of respondents in Herat and Badghis provinces. A recommended sample size of 1,600 respondents was constrained by resources and safe access and the actual sample size was 1,327 respondents. This sample was constructed using the following criteria:

- 60% in Herat, 40% in Badghis
- 50% male, 50% female
- 75% rural communities, 25% IDP Sites[74]
- In the rural communities: 50% who had stayed and 50% who had left and later returned.
- Inclusion of respondents of different ages

The rural communities were selected based on local knowledge, accessibility and safety for the enumerators. These were near Injil and Guzara in Herat Province and near Qala-e-Naw, Muqur and Aba Kamari in Badghis province. The IDP Site(s) were selected in collaboration with local humanitarian agencies/actors. In Herat these were Shahrak-e-Sabz and Shaidayee Camp and clinic. In Badghis these were Kharistan Camp and Sanjitak Camp. While the term "Camp" is used in their names, we were asked to refer to them as IDP Sites.



[74] An operational decision in Herat increased the proportion of responses collected at IDP Site(s) from 25% to 45%. While this was not planned, it reflected the large number of migrants, many of whom had travelled from Badghis.

SenseMaker® is a hybrid 'quantitative method for qualitative data'. In this method, findings and insights are based on 'second-order sense-making' of aggregate patterns (i.e. clusters, outliers and unexpected gaps) in the position of marks provided by each respondent between pre-defined signification anchors. To identify, analyse and explore patterns, the sample needs to be large enough to allow at least 50 respondents to remain after the data has been filtered / disaggregated by up to 3 socio-demographic questions (e.g. community, type[75] and land tenure).[76]

Although SenseMaker® is a quantitative method for qualitative data, its findings are treated as qualitative. As such, they support inferential links between groups of responses / respondents but cannot be generalised on a statistically valid basis to the wider population from which the sample was drawn. This is coherent with the purpose of SenseMaker® which is to identify how specific parts of the current landscape in a complex adaptive system are disposed to change and to design and implement portfolios of small safe-to-fail initiatives as catalytic probes. In complex systems, there is no predictable relationship between cause and effect so all change needs to be small and local until patterns crystallise and can be scaled within tighter constraints.

[75] Types of respondent are: those who stayed in their communities, those who left and later returned, those who left and have not yet returned but expect to do so, and – finally – those who left and do not expect to return.

[76] Power law calculations used to calculate sample size in quantitative studies are not applicable because they require a prior decision on the magnitude of the effect of an intervention: SenseMaker® is exploratory and intended to discover what is not yet known rather than to achieve a pre-defined effect. The concept of 'saturation' (based on Grounded Theory) used to underpin many qualitative research studies is also not applicable because SenseMaker® is interested in the density of data as well as its diversity.

Annex 4: Supporting data for the socio-demographic questions & comments on quality

This section of Annex 3 includes data tables and additional commentary for the socio-demographic questions discussed in the main part of the report starting on page **Error! Bookmark not defined.**. The data tables are provided in the same sequence as the charts which they support – and are cross-referenced to the relevant figure. This starts with Figure 3.

Data for Figure 5 - Type of respondent by community (on page 21)

Table 5 - Number of respondents by community, type and gender

			#		% Across then Down		#	% Across then Do..
			Male	Female	Male	Female	Total	Total
Herat	Injil	Stayed	90	102	32%	36%	192	68%
		Left & returned	50	42	18%	15%	92	32%
		Total	140	144	49%	51%	284	100%
	Guzara	Stayed	43	26	26%	16%	69	41%
		Left & returned	43	45	26%	27%	88	53%
		We expect to return						
		We do not expect to return		10		6%	10	6%
		Total	86	81	51%	49%	167	100%
	Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee Camp and clinic	Stayed	2	1	1%	0%	3	1%
		Left & returned	1		0%		1	0%
		We expect to return	88	30	24%	8%	118	33%
		We do not expect to return	89	152	25%	42%	241	66%
		Total	180	183	50%	50%	363	100%
	Total		406	408	50%	50%	814	100%
Badghis	Qala-e-Naw	Stayed	34	41	26%	31%	75	57%
		Left & returned	30	25	23%	19%	55	42%
		We expect to return	1		1%		1	1%
		Total	65	66	50%	50%	131	100%
	Muqur	Stayed	35	39	25%	28%	74	53%
		Left & returned	30	31	21%	22%	61	44%
		We expect to return	3		2%		3	2%
		We do not expect to return		2		1%	2	1%
		Total	68	72	49%	51%	140	100%
	Aba Kamari	Stayed	24	25	20%	21%	49	41%
		Left & returned	36	34	30%	29%	70	59%
		Total	60	59	50%	50%	119	100%
	Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak Camp	Stayed	6	1	5%	1%	7	6%
		We expect to return	21	17	17%	14%	38	31%
		We do not expect to return	33	45	27%	37%	78	63%
		Total	60	63	49%	51%	123	100%
	Total		253	260	49%	51%	513	100%
Grand Total			659	668	50%	50%	1,327	100%

The small percentage of respondents in Guzara and Muqur who said that they 'Do not expect to return' is taken to mean that they were not in their own community when the data was collected. The 11 respondents at the IDP Sites who said that they had not moved from their land or had left and returned may be an anomaly in the data or, alternatively, might have respondents at the IDP Site on a temporary

basis (perhaps to secure emergency aid[77]) who did not consider that they had actually moved away from their land. ***In any future collection, enumerators will need to use the endnote facility to provide an explanation if they accept what appears to be an invalid response to a socio-demographic question.***

Data for Figure 6 - Community/IDP Site by land tenure (on page 22)

See data below in Table 6 – Number of respondents by land tenure, community and gender

Options in the question on land tenure are listed opposite. In hindsight, this question might have been ambiguous for respondents who had left their community and not yet returned: these respondents may have referred to their tenure prior to leaving their community or their tenure at the time the data was being collected. Since most of these respondents were at an IDP site, their tenure at time of collection would almost certainly have been given as 'squatter'; however, as illustrated in Figure 6 on page 22 and in the following table, this is true for less than a half of respondents at the IDP Site(s) in Herat for none of the respondents at IDP Site(s) in Badghis. ***In any future collection, operational testing of the framework needs to pay attention to the clarity of the socio-demographic questions as well as to the clarity of the sense-making questions.***

- I own my land
- I rent my land
- I am a squatter – including:
  - I have land tenure, but it is contested
  - The owner of the land is unknown
  - I live on common land
  - I live on pasture that is held in common
- None of the above (interpreted as wage workers)

Table 6 – Number of respondents by land tenure, community and gender

			#		% Across then Down		#	% Across..
			Male	Female	Male	Female	Total	Total
Herat	I own my land	Injil	87	72	26%	21%	159	47%
		Guzara	40	43	12%	13%	83	25%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..	39	56	12%	17%	95	28%
		Total	166	171	49%	51%	337	100%
	I rent the land	Injil	39	26	27%	18%	65	44%
		Guzara	33	19	22%	13%	52	35%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..	18	12	12%	8%	30	20%
		Total	90	57	61%	39%	147	100%
	I live or squat on common / contested land	Injil	2	21	1%	11%	23	12%
		Guzara	5	10	3%	5%	15	8%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..	84	74	43%	38%	158	81%
		Total	91	105	46%	54%	196	100%
	Wage earner / None of the above	Injil	12	25	9%	19%	37	28%
		Guzara	8	8	6%	6%	16	12%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..	39	41	29%	31%	80	60%
		Total	59	74	44%	56%	133	100%
	Total		406	408	50%	50%	814	100%

[77] This was highlighted in IDMC's Spotlight on Afghanistan (ibid) which reported that vulnerable families in the host community set up makeshift shelters among the new IDPs in an attempt to secure humanitarian assistance.

Table 6 – Number of respondents by land tenure, community and gender (continued)

			#		% Across then Down		#	% Across..
			Male	Female	Male	Female	Total	Total
Badghis	I own my land	Qala-e-Naw	40	25	17%	11%	65	27%
		Muqur	41	37	17%	16%	78	33%
		Aba Kamari	40	25	17%	11%	65	27%
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..	17	12	7%	5%	29	12%
		Total	138	99	58%	42%	237	100%
	I rent the land	Qala-e-Naw	9	1	18%	2%	10	20%
		Muqur	14	6	28%	12%	20	40%
		Aba Kamari	10	2	20%	4%	12	24%
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..	7	1	14%	2%	8	16%
		Total	40	10	80%	20%	50	100%
	I live or squat on common / contested land	Qala-e-Naw		2		40%	2	40%
		Muqur	1	2	20%	40%	3	60%
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..						
		Total	1	4	20%	80%	5	100%
	Wage earner / None of the above	Qala-e-Naw	16	38	8%	20%	54	28%
		Muqur	12	9	6%	5%	21	11%
		Aba Kamari	10	23	5%	12%	33	17%
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..	36	49	19%	25%	85	44%
		Total	74	119	38%	62%	193	100%
	Total		253	260	49%	51%	513	100%
Grand Total			659	668	50%	50%	1,327	100%

Data for Figure 7 - Type of respondent by land tenure (on page 22)

The table below provides a further perspective on the data and highlights a substantive difference between male and female respondents in Herat. While ***50% of male respondents who had not yet returned to their communities expected to return, only 15% of female respondents (i.e. 7% of 47%) expected to do so***. This difference would benefit from further exploration.

Table 7 – Number of respondents by gender, land tenure by gender and type

			#				% Across then Down				#	% Across then Do..
			Stayed	Left & returned	We expect to return	We do not expect to return	Stayed	Left & returned	We expect to return	We do not expect to return	Total	Total
Herat	Male	I own my land	78	49	18	21	19%	12%	4%	5%	166	41%
		I rent the land	43	30	12	5	11%	7%	3%	1%	90	22%
		I live or squat on common / c..	3	5	41	42	1%	1%	10%	10%	91	22%
		Wage earner / None of the a..	11	10	17	21	3%	2%	4%	5%	59	15%
		Total	135	94	88	89	33%	23%	22%	22%	406	100%
	Female	I own my land	60	46	6	59	15%	11%	1%	14%	171	42%
		I rent the land	25	19	2	11	6%	5%	0%	3%	57	14%
		I live or squat on common / c..	24	8	11	62	6%	2%	3%	15%	105	26%
		Wage earner / None of the a..	19	14	11	30	5%	3%	3%	7%	74	18%
		Not specified	1				0%				1	0%
		Total	129	87	30	162	32%	21%	7%	40%	408	100%
	Total		264	181	118	251	32%	22%	14%	31%	814	100%
Badghis	Male	I own my land	58	65	9	6	23%	26%	4%	2%	138	55%
		I rent the land	14	18	3	5	6%	7%	1%	2%	40	16%
		I live or squat on common / c..		1				0%			1	0%
		Wage earner / None of the a..	27	12	13	22	11%	5%	5%	9%	74	29%
		Total	99	96	25	33	39%	38%	10%	13%	253	100%
	Female	I own my land	46	42	2	9	18%	16%	1%	3%	99	38%
		I rent the land	4	5		1	2%	2%		0%	10	4%
		I live or squat on common / c..	1	3			0%	1%			4	2%
		Wage earner / None of the a..	43	27	14	35	17%	10%	5%	13%	119	46%
		Not specified	12	13	1	2	5%	5%	0%	1%	28	11%
		Total	106	90	17	47	41%	35%	7%	18%	260	100%
	Total		205	186	42	80	40%	36%	8%	16%	513	100%
Grand Total			469	367	160	331	35%	28%	12%	25%	1,327	100%

Data for Figure 8 - Willingness to join a community cooperative scheme by land tenure (on page 23)

The analysis by gender provided in this table suggests that the difference between the willingness of respondents in Herat and Badghis to participate in a local community-based cooperative scheme (as highlighted in the main report) appears to be the consequence of the views of ***female respondents in Badghis who were considerably less willing to participate than male respondents***. Since this gender difference was not evident (in fact, if anything, it was the reverse) amongst respondents in Herat, it would benefit from further exploration.

Table 8 - Willingness to participate in community-based co-operative schemes

			#						% Across then Down						#	% Across then Do..
			Very willing	Willing	Neither willing or unwilling	Unwilling	Very unwilling	Not specified	Very willing	Willing	Neither willing or unwilling	Unwilling	Very unwilling	Not specified	Total	Total
Herat	Male	I own my land	38	82	21	7	1	17	9%	20%	5%	2%	0%	4%	166	41%
		I rent the land	25	42	11	1		11	6%	10%	3%	0%		3%	90	22%
		I live or squat on common / c..	19	50	9	9	1	3	5%	12%	2%	2%	0%	1%	91	22%
		Wage earner / None of the a..	21	25	5	3	1	4	5%	6%	1%	1%	0%	1%	59	15%
		Total	103	199	46	20	3	35	25%	49%	11%	5%	1%	9%	406	100%
	Female	I own my land	80	72	9	4	4	2	20%	18%	2%	1%	1%	0%	171	42%
		I rent the land	23	26	1	2	3	2	6%	6%	0%	0%	1%	0%	57	14%
		I live or squat on common / c..	45	56	2	2			11%	14%	0%	0%			105	26%
		Wage earner / None of the a..	44	22	5	1	1	1	11%	5%	1%	0%	0%	0%	74	18%
		Not specified	1						0%						1	0%
		Total	193	176	17	9	8	5	47%	43%	4%	2%	2%	1%	408	100%
	Total		296	375	63	29	11	40	36%	46%	8%	4%	1%	5%	814	100%
Badghis	Male	I own my land	91	36	9	2			36%	14%	4%	1%			138	55%
		I rent the land	1	28	6	5			0%	11%	2%	2%			40	16%
		I live or squat on common / c..	1						0%						1	0%
		Wage earner / None of the a..	47	8	8	8	3		19%	3%	3%	3%	1%		74	29%
		Total	140	72	23	15	3		55%	28%	9%	6%	1%		253	100%
	Female	I own my land		28	21	40	10			11%	8%	15%	4%		99	38%
		I rent the land		4	3	1	2			2%	1%	0%	1%		10	4%
		I live or squat on common / c..			2	1	1				1%	0%	0%		4	2%
		Wage earner / None of the a..	1	16	39	60	3		0%	6%	15%	23%	1%		119	46%
		Not specified		13	4	10	1			5%	2%	4%	0%		28	11%
		Total	1	61	69	112	17		0%	23%	27%	43%	7%		260	100%
	Total		141	133	92	127	20		27%	26%	18%	25%	4%		513	100%
Grand Total			437	508	155	156	31	40	33%	38%	12%	12%	2%	3%	1,327	100%

Data for Figure 9 - Source of agricultural water by community/IDP Site (on page 23)

Table 9 - Source of agricultural water by community

		#			% Across then Down			#	% Across then Do..
		Irrigated	Rain-fed	Not specified	Irrigated	Rain-fed	Not specified	Total	Total
Herat	Injil	205	61	18	25%	7%	2%	284	35%
	Guzara	101	51	15	12%	6%	2%	167	21%
	Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shai..	71	263	29	9%	32%	4%	363	45%
	Total	377	375	62	46%	46%	8%	814	100%
Badghis	Qala-e-Naw	8	72	51	2%	14%	10%	131	26%
	Muqur	6	96	38	1%	19%	7%	140	27%
	Aba Kamari		79	40		15%	8%	119	23%
	Kharistan Camp & San..	2	92	29	0%	18%	6%	123	24%
	Total	16	339	158	3%	66%	31%	513	100%
Grand Total		393	714	220	30%	54%	17%	1,327	100%

It may have been useful to have asked the respondents if they had implemented any water management techniques.

Data for Figure 10 - Knowledge of the drought by community/IDP site (on page 24)

The seemingly improbable data in Figure 10 - Knowledge of the drought by community/IDP site on page 24 and in Table 11 below that 85% of respondents did not know that a drought was coming suggests that ***if further work is carried to monitor the impact of lived experience of drought or other disasters resulting from natural hazards, it should include questions that distinguish more clearly between what people know and what people have been told on a formal basis.***

Table 10 - Knowledge of the drought by community & gender (Numbers)

			We could see it by watching the land	We were told by friends and neighbours	We heard about it on the news/radio	We were told by an extension worker	We did not know a drought was coming	Not specified	Total
Herat	Male	Injil	9	4	2	4	121		140
		Guzara	1	1	3		81		86
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..	10	1	2	1	166		180
		Total	20	6	7	5	368		406
	Female	Injil	52	9	9	1	73		144
		Guzara	13	7	2		55	4	81
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..	11	3	5	1	163		183
		Total	76	19	16	2	291	4	408
	Total		96	25	23	7	659	4	814
Badghis	Male	Qala-e-Naw			1		64		65
		Muqur	1	2	4		61		68
		Aba Kamari		1	2		57		60
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..			1		59		60
		Total	1	3	8		241		253
	Female	Qala-e-Naw	7	4	2		53		66
		Muqur	1	9	5		57		72
		Aba Kamari	5	1			53		59
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..	2				61		63
		Total	15	14	7		224		260
	Total		16	17	15		465		513
Grand Total			112	42	38	7	1,124	4	1,327

Table 11 - Knowledge of the drought by community & gender (Percentages)

			We could see it by watching the land	We were told by friends and neighbours	We heard about it on the news/radio	We were told by an extension worker	We did not know a drought was coming	Not specified	Total
Herat	Male	Injil	2%	1%	0%	1%	30%		34%
		Guzara	0%	0%	1%		20%		21%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..	2%	0%	0%	0%	41%		44%
		Total	5%	1%	2%	1%	91%		100%
	Female	Injil	13%	2%	2%	0%	18%		35%
		Guzara	3%	2%	0%		13%	1%	20%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..	3%	1%	1%	0%	40%		45%
		Total	19%	5%	4%	0%	71%	1%	100%
	Total		12%	3%	3%	1%	81%	0%	100%
Badghis	Male	Qala-e-Naw			0%		25%		26%
		Muqur	0%	1%	2%		24%		27%
		Aba Kamari		0%	1%		23%		24%
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..			0%		23%		24%
		Total	0%	1%	3%		95%		100%
	Female	Qala-e-Naw	3%	2%	1%		20%		25%
		Muqur	0%	3%	2%		22%		28%
		Aba Kamari	2%	0%			20%		23%
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..	1%				23%		24%
		Total	6%	5%	3%		86%		100%
	Total		3%	3%	3%		91%		100%
Grand Total			8%	3%	3%	1%	85%	0%	100%

Data for Figure 11 - Wealth by community/IDP site (on page 24)

Table 12 - Self-assessed comparative wealth by community and gender

			#				% Across then Down				#	% Across then Do..
			Rich or Average	Poor	Very poor	Null & Prefer not to say	Rich or Average	Poor	Very poor	Null & Prefer not to say	Total	Total
Herat	Male	Injil	57	60	23		14%	15%	6%		140	34%
		Guzara	37	35	14		9%	9%	3%		86	21%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..	30	19	129	2	7%	5%	32%	0%	180	44%
		Total	124	114	166	2	31%	28%	41%	0%	406	100%
	Female	Injil	24	72	48		6%	18%	12%		144	35%
		Guzara	21	28	31	1	5%	7%	8%	0%	81	20%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shaidayee ..		14	169			3%	41%		183	45%
		Total	45	114	248	1	11%	28%	61%	0%	408	100%
	Total		169	228	414	3	21%	28%	51%	0%	814	100%
Badghis	Male	Qala-e-Naw	4	17	44		2%	7%	17%		65	26%
		Muqur	16	28	24		6%	11%	9%		68	27%
		Aba Kamari	5	19	36		2%	8%	14%		60	24%
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..	1	3	56		0%	1%	22%		60	24%
		Total	26	67	160		10%	26%	63%		253	100%
	Female	Qala-e-Naw	2	18	46		1%	7%	18%		66	25%
		Muqur	3	25	44		1%	10%	17%		72	28%
		Aba Kamari	2	8	49		1%	3%	19%		59	23%
		Kharistan Camp & Sanjitak C..		4	59			2%	23%		63	24%
		Total	7	55	198		3%	21%	76%		260	100%
	Total		33	122	358		6%	24%	70%		513	100%
Grand Total			202	350	772	3	15%	26%	58%	0%	1,327	100%

The additional analysis by gender included above suggests that female respondents in Herat were less positive about their comparative wealth than their male counterparts.

Data for other socio-demographic questions not used in the main analysis

Socio-demographic questions for age, role in family, number of members of the family who were able / not able to work did not provide any useful data for the analysis. However, the relevant data tables are provided here for completeness.

Table 13 - Age group of respondents by community and gender

			#				% Across then Down				#	% Across then Do..
			Of working age	Under working age	Too old to work	Prefer not to say	Of working age	Under working age	Too old to work	Prefer not to say	Total	Total
Herat	Male	Injil	120	3	17		30%	1%	4%		140	34%
		Guzara	65		21		16%		5%		86	21%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shai..	158	2	20		39%	0%	5%		180	44%
		Total	343	5	58		84%	1%	14%		406	100%
	Female	Injil	115		28	1	28%		7%	0%	144	35%
		Guzara	52	1	27	1	13%	0%	7%	0%	81	20%
		Shahrak-e-Sabz, Shai..	127	2	54		31%	0%	13%		183	45%
		Total	294	3	109	2	72%	1%	27%	0%	408	100%
	Total		637	8	167	2	78%	1%	21%	0%	814	100%
Badghis	Male	Qala-e-Naw	62		3		25%		1%		65	26%
		Muqur	53	2	13		21%	1%	5%		68	27%
		Aba Kamari	54		6		21%		2%		60	24%
		Kharistan Camp & San..	52		8		21%		3%		60	24%
		Total	221	2	30		87%	1%	12%		253	100%
	Female	Qala-e-Naw	53	1	12		20%	0%	5%		66	25%
		Muqur	57		15		22%		6%		72	28%
		Aba Kamari	42	2	15		16%	1%	6%		59	23%
		Kharistan Camp & San..	50	1	11	1	19%	0%	4%	0%	63	24%
		Total	202	4	53	1	78%	2%	20%	0%	260	100%
	Total		423	6	83	1	82%	1%	16%	0%	513	100%
Grand Total			1,060	14	250	3	80%	1%	19%	0%	1,327	100%

Table 14 - Age group by gender and province

		#		% Down		#	% Down
		Herat	Badghis	Herat	Badghis	Total	Total
Male	Of working age	343	221	84%	87%	564	86%
	Too old to work	58	30	14%	12%	88	13%
	Under working age	5	2	1%	1%	7	1%
	Prefer not to say						
	Total	406	253	100%	100%	659	100%
Female	Of working age	294	202	72%	78%	496	74%
	Too old to work	109	53	27%	20%	162	24%
	Under working age	3	4	1%	2%	7	1%
	Prefer not to say	2	1	0%	0%	3	0%
	Total	408	260	100%	100%	668	100%
Total		814	513	100%	100%	1,327	100%

Table 15 - Role in family by gender and province

		#		% Down		#	% Down
		Herat	Badghis	Herat	Badghis	Total	Total
Male	Head of the family	337	225	83%	89%	562	85%
	Grandparent	1		0%		1	0%
	Father / Mother	38	7	9%	3%	45	7%
	Husband / Wife (without chi..		1		0%	1	0%
	Son / Brother	30	20	7%	8%	50	8%
	Prefer not to say						
	Total	406	253	100%	100%	659	100%
Female	Head of the family	42	28	10%	11%	70	10%
	Grandparent	29	31	7%	12%	60	9%
	Father / Mother	326	191	80%	73%	517	77%
	Husband / Wife (without chi..		4		2%	4	1%
	Daughter / Sister	10	6	2%	2%	16	2%
	Prefer not to say	1		0%		1	0%
	Total	408	260	100%	100%	668	100%
Total		814	513	100%	100%	1,327	100%

Table 16 - Number of people able to work in each respondent's family by gender and province

		#		% Down		#	% Down
		Herat	Badghis	Herat	Badghis	Total	Total
Male	0	7	12	2%	5%	19	3%
	1	265	121	65%	48%	386	59%
	2	75	89	18%	35%	164	25%
	3	30	25	7%	10%	55	8%
	4	17	6	4%	2%	23	3%
	5	7		2%		7	1%
	Not specified	5		1%		5	1%
	Total	406	253	100%	100%	659	100%
Female	0	40	22	10%	8%	62	9%
	1	258	129	63%	50%	387	58%
	2	71	89	17%	34%	160	24%
	3	33	16	8%	6%	49	7%
	4	4		1%		4	1%
	5	1	1	0%	0%	2	0%
	Not specified	1	3	0%	1%	4	1%
	Total	408	260	100%	100%	668	100%
Total		814	513	100%	100%	1,327	100%

Table 17 - Number of people not able to work in each respondent's family by gender and province

		#		% Down		#	% Down
		Herat	Badghis	Herat	Badghis	Total	Total
Male	0	10		2%		10	2%
	1	11	1	3%	0%	12	2%
	2	23	5	6%	2%	28	4%
	3	37	10	9%	4%	47	7%
	4	55	20	14%	8%	75	11%
	5	93	53	23%	21%	146	22%
	Not specified	177	164	44%	65%	341	52%
	Total	406	253	100%	100%	659	100%
Female	0		2		1%	2	0%
	1	4	3	1%	1%	7	1%
	2	9	9	2%	3%	18	3%
	3	17	12	4%	5%	29	4%
	4	55	15	13%	6%	70	10%
	5	112	49	27%	19%	161	24%
	Not specified	211	170	52%	65%	381	57%
	Total	408	260	100%	100%	668	100%
Total		814	513	100%	100%	1,327	100%

Annex 5: Cooperative Insurance (Takaful) for Drought

While conventional insurance is forbidden by Islamic Religious Law, an alternative referred to as cooperative insurance (or "Takaful" in Arabic), is generally considered to be acceptable.[78] If this cooperative framework could be used in some way to establish a service comparable to the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) set-up by the African Union (AU), it may provide considerable value to GIRoA, NGOs, commercial organisations and individual farmers in Afghanistan. The following description is copied from https://www.africanriskcapacity.org/about/

The African Risk Capacity (ARC) is a Specialized Agency of the African Union established to help African governments improve their capacities to better plan, prepare, and respond to extreme weather events and disasters resulting from natural hazards. Through collaboration and innovative finance, ARC enables countries to strengthen their disaster risk management systems and access rapid and predictable financing when disaster strikes to protect the food security and livelihoods of their vulnerable populations.

As currently structured, the international system for responding to disasters resulting from natural hazards is not as timely or equitable as it could be. Funding is secured on a largely ad hoc basis after disaster strikes, and only then can relief be mobilized toward the people who need it most. In the meantime, lives are lost, assets are depleted, and development gains suffer major setbacks – forcing more people into chronic destitution and food insecurity in the world's least developed countries.

ARC is an African solution to one of the continent's most pressing challenges, transferring the burden of climate risk away from governments – and the farmers and pastoralists whom they protect – to the ARC that can handle that risk much better. This African-owned, AU-led financial entity uses Africa RiskView, an advanced satellite weather surveillance and software – developed by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) – to estimate and trigger readily available funds to African countries hit by severe weather events. Because such events do not happen in the same year in all parts of the continent, pan-African solidarity in the creation of a disaster risk pool like ARC is financially effective. Pooling risk across the continent could significantly reduce the cost to countries of emergency contingency funds, while decreasing reliance on external aid.

[78] Some religious scholars also object to Takaful but their concerns may be addressed by framing the relationship between the Takaful operator and the ('insured') participants as a business partnership for mutual benefit rather than as commercial purchase of insurance for a premium. See url for discussion of details.

Annex 6: Magenta's Literature Review

LITERATURE REVIEW

Investigating the attitudes, behaviours, coping mechanisms and decision-making processes of those displaced by drought

Submitted BY **MAGENTA FZC** to:

UNDP Afghanistan

19 November 2019

Source: The World Bank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

THE CHALLENGE OF DROUGHT

Droughts represent a major challenge in Afghanistan, straining already stretched Afghan public services, and showing signs of increasing in frequency. While other natural disasters such as earthquakes, epidemics and floods cause more deaths, droughts affect the most people, destroying livelihoods and incurring displacement.[1] Afghanistan in particular should be concerned with the future impact of drought, as it is one of the ten most vulnerable countries to climate change, likely to experience a significant increase in drought frequency.[2] The World Food program estimates that by 2030 annual droughts will become the norm rather than cyclical events for much of the country, owing to projected temperature increases predicted to average 2°C in the centre of the country between 2021 and 2050.[3] Adding to the challenge of drought, the average annual rainfall is expected to increase while spring and summer rainfall will decrease, leading to a build-up of winter snow, which, paired with increased temperatures, increases the likelihood of flash floods.[4]

Climate change and drought therefore constitute a crucial challenge for the future of Afghanistan. Droughts affect and damage the livelihoods of significant portions of Afghans in light of the socio-economic composition of Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains essentially a pastoralist and agricultural nation, two activities which are most significantly affected by drought. 61% of the country relies on agriculture as a source of income, and 44% on it as a source of employment. 45% of Afghan territory is in permanent pasture.[5] Land ownership is particularly complicated in Afghanistan, as rights are governened by an overlap of informal, traditional, civil and state laws.[6] Pastoral lands are nominally state-owned as the Pasture law of 1970 outlawed the purchase or sale of pasture, however de facto some governors continue to dispose of pastures in ways tatamount to privitisation although the documents of allocation remain unclear as to whether ownership or use is ceded.[7] Droughts affect the viability of growing certain crops and building a sustainable self-reliant livelihood. The trend to decreased spring rainfall paired with a high percentage of Afghanistan's population relying on livelihoods heavily dependent on

1, "Afghanistan Strategic National Action Plan (SNAP) for disaster risk reduction" Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan March 2011
2 "Key information on drought impact and development in Afghanistan" UNDP
3 "Climate change in Afghanistan: What it means for rural livelihoods and food security?" World Food Program, UNEP
4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 "Land Reform in Afghanistan" USAID May 2019
7 "The battle over pastures, the hidden war in Afghanistan" Liz Alden Wily Guerre et Terre en Afghanistan, June 2013

rainfall, increases the likelihood of crises, displacement, and need for humanitarian intervention.

Prior to identifying a strategy to increase populations' ability to cope with drought, the origins of water reliance must be clarified. The World Food Program (WFP) identifies two types of drought with different causes and affecting different people. The first type of drought is caused by reduced spring and summer rainfall, and mostly affects livelihoods dependent on rainfed irrigation, cereal production or pastoralism. Central, North and North-Eastern provinces are most affected by these droughts. The second type of drought is induced by a reduced river flow due to reduced snowmelt in the mountains, and affects areas reliant on all crop production (besides poppy), mainly a stretch from Kabul to Kandahar.[8] Building resilience to drought necessarily must bear in mind the different types of drought and their impact.

Any analysis of livelihoods in Afghanistan, and internally displaced persons (IDPs), must take into account that drought is but one factor affecting people's livelihoods and decision-making. It is not as simple as pinpointing a single element as the key in displacing people, who rather make the move as a result of a multitude of circumstances. Early IDP interviews carried out by IOM indeed indicate that, while drought was the most often cited reason for displacement, conflict and insecurity was a very close second, followed by a variety of factors from lack of humanitarian assistance to lack of jobs and economic opportunity.[9] Drought is a challenge to livelihoods but is not the single driver of displacement.

The most recent and impactful drought in decades struck in 2018, displacing 260,000 from North-western provinces into temporary camps around the capitals of Badghis and Herat.[10] Most of the IDPs were displaced from agro-pastoral lands north of Herat-city, driven out by reduced rainfall (). This event foreshadows what the future may look like in Afghanistan if no measures are undertaken to increase rural populations' capacities to protect their livelihoods from drought: mass displacement, food shortages, humanitarian crises and dependent populations, thereby stressing the importance of building resilience to this increasingly likely climatic event.

8 Ibid
9 "Drought Response Situation Report," International Organization for Migration, 29 March 2019.
10 « Afghan drought displacing more people than Taliban conflict » BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45872897

LIVELIHOODS



Livelihood zoning map, developed by FEWSNet with the Afghan government and development partners as part of the Livelihood Zoning "Plus" Exercise (2011). **These livelihood zones—rather than administrative units such as provinces or districts—are the analytical unit used in this study.** Each zone is linked to a detailed livelihood profile, which describes the key livelihood activities in that zone (and when they take place throughout the year), the types and sources of food and income, the key shocks and hazards, and the level of access/ reliance on markets.

Page 14

20 Northwestern agro-pastoral zone



Figure 1 Map of Livelihoods [1]

MAGENTA
SCALABLE AND SUSTAINABLE CHANGE

RESILIENCE IN TIMES OF DROUGHT

As aforementioned, droughts damage water-dependent livelihoods, and in the case of Afghanistan pastoralist and farmer lifestyles are most affected. Encouraging resilience, which for the purposes of this project shall be considered as the ability of communities to withstand the impact of drought on their livelihoods without need of external aid, is an appropriate response to the trend indicating an increased likelihood of severe droughts in Afghanistan. Resilience can derive from various elements, physical assets, community support or it can be psychological.

Various agencies have developed frameworks pertaining to the key elements of building resilience to drought. Neville Crossman, a researcher specialising in understanding the impact of land and water management decisions, in the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) defined the Drought Resilience Adaptation and Management Policy (DRAMP) framework (Figure 2). He identified six key actions to take, subdivided into three key pillars to increase drought resilience. The first pillar is 'implementing drought monitoring systems and early warning systems', the second is 'assessing drought vulnerability and risk', the third is 'implementing measures to limit the impact of drought and better response to drought'.[11] In other words, to increase overall resilience, communities must be aware of the arrival of drought, of the risk of drought, and of techniques to reduce their vulnerability to it.

11 "Drought Resilience, Adaptation and management policy (DRAMP) Framework" Neville Crossman UNCCD 2018

Figure 2 Dramp framework[12]

USAID developed a framework for resilience to climate more broadly, with an annex pertaining especially to situations where conflict and climate interact to break down resilience (Figure 3). They advocate pinpointing the development goals before determining enabling conditions (key actors, or institutions) and identifying climate and non-climate stressors that hinder the development goals. All climate-change resilience building must be conflict-sensitive, abiding by the "do no harm principle" at a minimum and preferably actively contributing to bolstering institutions and governance in line with a clear theory of change.[13] USAID also defined a framework identifying three key elements in promoting resilience: institutions, resources and adaptive faciliators, suggesting that resilience relies both on physical resilience (resources and institutions) and

[12] "Drought Resilience, Adaptation and management policy (DRAMP) Framework" Neville Crossman UNCCD 2018

13 « Climate Change and Conflict an annex to USAID climate resilient development framework » USAID February 2015

behavioural change (Figure 4).[14] Finally there is another USAID framework for resilience pertaining to recurring crises, identifying two main factors for increasing resilience: risk reduction (including elements such as warning systems) and adaptive capacity (including education and livelihood strategizing) (Figure 5).[15]

Figure 3 USAID Framework[16]

[14] "A framework for Analysing resilience in Fragile and conflict affected situations" USAID 2013
[15] "Building resilience to recurring crisis" USAID Policy and program guidance December 2012
[16] « Climate Change and Conflict an annex to USAID climate resilient development framework » USAID February 2015



Figure 4 USAID key factors[17]



Figure 5 USAID recurring crisis framework[18]

[17] "A framework for Analysing resilience in Fragile and conflict affected situations" USAID 2013
[18] "Building resilience to recurring crisis" USAID Policy and program guidance December 2012

The aforementioned frameworks deal with resilience in drought quite broadly; however certain authors, particularly academics, have written about building resilience to drought by focusing on the individual. Singh and Chudasama assess the impact of drought on farmers' perspectives of their livelihoods. In times of drought farmers perceive the deceleration of agricultural production, driving them to borrow money from local lenders to stock their food reserves. Communities are then noted to generally adopt adaptational behaviours, ranging from dependent behaviours such as reliance on government schemes and dependence on markets, to more self-sustaining ones including water resource management, and diversification of livelihoods. They adopt adaptational behaviours they are aware of and capable of implementing, to palliate the effects of drought. Ideal behaviours include diversifying crops, changing irrigation systems, seeking off-farm employment and seeking alternative income sources. The key to building resilience according to Singh and Chudasama lies in distinguishing between assets which encourage resilience and those which are vulnerable to drought. Vulnerable communities can then adopt the most appropriate adaptive behaviour.[19] Building off the aforementioned conclusions drawn from frameworks dealing with drought at the community level, the adoption of adaptational behaviours by individuals depends on their awareness of the arrival of drought, of the risk and impact of drought and of potential adaptative solutions. Similarly, Wens, Johnson, Zagaria and Veldkamp, propose a community-centric sociohydrological approach to reducing drought risk. Agents choose adaptational behaviours in response to perceived risk of drought in accordance to three factors: their perceptions, their ability to adapt, and their social network (Figure 6).[20] External support should focus on informing and encouraging desirable adaptive behaviours.

Beyond studies of resilience in drought there has been a relevant study regarding resilience more broadly in Afghanistan, with regards to conflict in particular, revealing the main drivers of Afghan resilience which may be relevant. A study conducted amongst rural Afghans identified key Afghan cultural values that promoted resilience to hardship. At its core *koshesh* and *iman* are the two central sources of strength in the face of misfortune. *Iman* (faith) promotes the belief that adversity is the will of god, while *Koshesh* (perseverance and effort) is the belief that hard work can eventually overcome hardship, considering that everyday resilience and faith will be rewarded with his "mercy" and "protection". A study of the Hazara communities in the 1970s concluded that the strong relationship between faith and endurance was the central element of continued hope.[21]

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19 "Pathways for drought resilient livelihoods based on people's perception" Pramod Singh, Hapalsih Chudasama Climate Change 2017

20 « Integrating human behaviour dynamics in drought risk assessment- A sociohydrologic, agent-based approach » Marthe Wens, Michael Johnson, Cecilia Zagaria, Ted Veldkamp March 2019

21 « Suffering, Hope and entrapment : Resilience and cultural values in Afghanistan » Mark Eggerman and Catherine Panter-Brick Social Science and Medecine 2010.

Building psychological resilience to drought amongst Afghans will certainly have to centre its messaging around the notions of koshesh and iman.



Figure 6 Framework integrating human behaviour[22]

DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF WORK

The term resilience can encompass a multitude of concepts, and identifying a specific definition of the term is essential to properly address it during this project. Various other notions also merit being grounded in a clear definition. These are identified below.

[22] « Integrating human behaviour dynamics in drought risk assessment- A sociohydrologic, agent-based approach » Marthe Wens, Michael Johnson, Cecilia Zagaria, Ted Veldkamp March 2019

- **Drought** can be considered as the natural reduction of precipitation compared to the multi-year average for the region, over an extended period of time, usually at least one planting season or more. Beyond precipitation observations drought includes the deficiency of surface and subsurface water supplies.[23]
- **Resilience** suggests a household or community is able to maintain a sufficient level of income and production above the livelihood protection threshold during both normal periods and crisis periods to meet the minimum required expenditure and consumption.[24] In a drought context this implies that resilient communities, in the event of a drought, will not need to rely on International assistance, nor leave their communities as IDPs.
- **Livelihoods** comprise the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.[25]
- **IDPs** are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.[26]

Given the substantial impact of drought in Afghanistan, UNDP has recognized the need to build the evidence base regarding resilience strategies of vulnerable populations. To that end, UNDP has engaged MAGENTA and other partners to further investigate the drivers of resilience in this context. As per the scope of the current project with UNDP, which seeks to build the resilience of vulnerable populations to drought, the following sections will focus on resilience specifically with regard to drought; however, in order to understand the social and behavioural drivers of resilience, the study of psychological resilience can also prove a valuable case study. For while many studies on resilience assess the importance of building assets, the role of the individual and individual agency is often relegated to a secondary status despite it being a key part of the equation. Moreover, it is important to note that while the trigger for the study was the mass displacements of 2018, the project aims to increase the resilience to drought of both IDPs and people who have remained in their Areas of Origin (AoO). Additionally, it should be

23 "Drought" Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN 2013
24 "Understanding Community resilience: findings from Community-based resilience analysis (CoBRA) Assessments" UNDP
25 « Guidance Note on Recovery Livelihood » UNDP
26 "UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.." MSV de Mello

considered that, while lack of drought resilience was a significant factor in IDP decision-making, other elements, such as conflict and insecurity, also played a considerable part in breaking down communities' ability to maintain their livelihoods. Drought resilience in the Afghan context cannot be assessed in a vacuum excluding conflict.

SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DRIVERS OF DECISION MAKING IN A DROUGHT CONTEXT

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Factors affecting an individual's resilience to climatic disaster are complex and vary by region and community. In order to gain a deeper understanding of whether individuals adopt resilient behaviours, MAGENTA has identified a conceptual framework for behavioural change which illustrates the different layers of factors which induce or discourage resilience.

Resilience to drought relies on communities' and individuals' physical and psychological ability to withstand the damages of dry seasons, conserve foodstuff and maintain enough resources to purchase essentials. Providing external assistance to vulnerable populations can palliate their needs in the short-term but is not a sustainable approach to building their long-term resilience. Marrying psychological resilience with physical resilience by promoting behavioural change and the adoption of sustainable livelihoods and agrarian techniques is the only way to ensure vulnerable communities can possess some degree of resilience to future drought. Logically, one must identify behaviours that increase the capacity of individuals and communities to be resilient to drought, as well as factors contributing to those behaviours, in order to encourage behaviour change.

This section will introduce a conceptual framework for social and behavioural change (SBC).

Socio-ecological framework

The Social Ecological Model (SEM) is a theory-based framework for understanding the dynamic interactive relations between various personal and environmental factors that affect behaviour. It can prove useful in identifying behavioural leverage points. There are four nested, hierarchical levels of the SEM: Individual, interpersonal, community,

organizational, and policy/enabling environment (Figure 7). The most effective approach to behavioral change would use a combination of interventions at all levels of the model.

Figure 7 The Socio-Ecological Framework

- **The policy** level includes local and national legislation which encourages and limits certain behaviours. Local, state and global laws and policies pertaining to agriculture and water management (ie introducing mandatory water monitoring systems) affect decision making of individuals.
- **The community and organisational** level encompasses both the rules and regulations of an organisation and the relationships within an informational network. These interactions (ie community leaders, local associations encouraging behaviours) can prove influential in affecting the attitudes of individuals.
- **The interpersonal level** refers to social support systems that can influence an individual's behaviour, including key elements such as interactions with family, friends, religious networks (how one's peers are behaving)
- **The individual level** covers personal characteristics of an individual which influence their behaviour, key factors include attitudes, self-efficacy, financial resources, values, expectations, and stigma. These factors, affect an individual's decision making behaviour.

MARRYING RESILIENCE AND SBC FRAMEWORKS

The resilience frameworks explained above concur in considering two elements as key to building resilience.

- **Risk Reduction,** including drought monitoring and early warning systems, assessing vulnerability and risk, social safety nets and financial protection, improving resources and ability/capacities.
- **Mitigation of impact,** implementing measures to limit impact of drought, designing adaptation options and implementing them, improving education, access to education and economic opportunities, taking into account the impact of social network and perceptions in triggering adaptive behaviours.

The SEM can act as a bridge between the resilience frameworks and social and behavioural change as it presents the various layers of socio-ecological actors which have a role both in affecting behaviour change and in building resilience. The pillars of resilience can also be embedded within the different levels of the SEM model. Risk reduction initiatives such as establishing early warning systems and raising awareness to drought emanate mostly from the policy and organisational levels, and are top down initiatives. On the other hand; mitigation of impact, which relies on the adoption of drought-resilient behaviour, centres on the lower levels, the individual and community.



Figure 8 Marrying Resilience Frameworks and the SEM model

APPLYING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO THE DROUGHT IN AFGHANISTAN

The theoretical framework above can be used to examine the recent drought in Afghanistan and the apparent lack of resilience—and resilient behaviours—among the Afghan population. The preliminary interviews of IDPs as part of IOM surveys in September 2018 and March 2019 are indicative of drivers of displacement. Key concerns and needs of the interviewed IDPs include food, employment opportunities, shelter, and health services. When asked what they would need to return to their AoOs, their responses reflected their concerns. Herat-based IDPs mentioned security, better environmental conditions, humanitarian assistance, and availability of livelihoods, in that order. Badghis-based IDPs cited security, better environmental conditions, availability of livelihoods and planting season in that order. The slight difference in prioritisation reflects that Badghis IDPs are more optimistic about being able to reconstruct their livelihoods so-long as the conditions are good, while Herat IDPs are more likely to consider rebuilding a livelihood only possible with external assistance. Structural barriers to building resilient livelihoods are deemed consequential insofar as IDPs believe services, infrastructure and opportunities are lacking. Moreover, IDPs expressed little awareness of alternatives to government aid

or improved environment conditions as an opportunity to return to their AoO, suggesting that they either are not aware, or do not believe that community-led initiatives can help them become resilient.

Significantly, IDPs from Herat and Badghis had slightly different approaches to staying informed about the situation in their AoO. IDPs in Herat, those more reticent to returning to their AoO, rated interpersonal sources, family and friends, newly arrived IDPs, mobile, and to a lesser degree the community level sources (community leaders), as the most important, trusted sources. Conversely, Badghis IDPs, while also rating interpersonal sources highly, did not neglect community and organisational sources, namely NGOs, authorities, and printed materials.[27] This suggests that overall, vulnerable populations are more likely to trust local sources for information, and that non-community led initiatives are not likely to be heard of and adhered to.

An overwhelming majority of the 100,000 IDPs still displaced in September 2019 are in Herat province.[28] The fact that IDPs in Badghis were willing to return to their AoO is indicative of the fact that they faced fewer barriers to return and to the rebuilding of their livelihoods. It is therefore essential to investigate whether an increased awareness of rebuilding possibilities, caused by use of different channels for staying informed and by different requirements identified to return to their AoO, led to greater rates of Badghis IDPs returning. Or whether different meta norms, social norms or structural barriers apply to IDPs in Herat compared to Badghis, limiting their belief and awareness of alternative farming techniques and livelihood choices which would make them drought resilient. It is also worth considering whether the different features of the locations to which Herat and Badghis IDPs were displaced affected their desire to return to their AoO.

Risk reduction and mitigation of impact measures are as of yet particularly scarce in rural Afghanistan. The GIRoA only officially declared a drought in April 2018, though the potential crisis had caught the attention of aid agencies as early as the autumn of 2017.[29] Policy fell short of establishing efficient monitoring systems, and warning vulnerable populations of the potential drought in a timely manner. In December 2018, the Environmental Conservation Specialist Organisation of Afghanistan (ECSOA) presented the shortcomings of the drought monitoring and warning system in Afghanistan, and asserted that the development, and implementation of an effective drought monitoring system constituted the essential precondition to both manage drought risk and provide

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[27] "Drought Response Situation Report," International Organization for Migration, 29 March 2019.

[28] "Humanitarian response plan, mid-year review" 2019 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/hrp-mid-year_report_jan_-_jun_2019_6_sep.pdf

[29] Ratcliffe, Rebecca, "'The country could fall apart:' drought and despair in Afghanistan." *The Guardian*, 25 March 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/mar/25/country-could-fall-apart-drought-despair-afghanistan

sufficient forewarning to allow the implementation drought mitigation techniques.[30] The presentation also emphasised the importance of informing the public on behaviours to adopt in order to limit activities conductive to climate change and in turn increasing the likelihood of drought. This information was disseminated on official channels such as Ariana Television Network.[31]

While televised public information shows represented an initial attempt of top-down efforts to reduce the risk of disaster, policy, by raising the alarm to drought too late, failed to reduce the risk of drought in 2018. Moreover, the lack of activities on the community or interpersonal level efforts limited the efficiency of the attempts to induce behavioural change. Moreover, Afghanistan lacks a cohesive plan for the mitigation of drought impact through the encouragement of adaptive behaviours and techniques. There are little to no policy level incentives or penalties introduced to encourage the adoption of water management techniques. Moreover, despite policy support for their adoption, there are few mechanisms dedicated to increasing public awareness of cheap and efficient techniques to mitigate the impact of drought (i.e building stone bunds on hillsides to slow down rainwater runoff and allow it time to seep into the soil) through either high level (media), community (community leaders, local associations), or interpersonal (behaviour change among peers of vulnerable populations) channels. Tribal and religious leaders' awareness and support of the construction of bunds and other adaptive agrarian techniques to reduce the impact of drought would prove an efficient method of encouraging said behavioural change amongst certain community members, in turn affecting other individuals through interpersonal interactions. Indeed, as IDPs attested as per above, interpersonal sources are the most trusted and influential socio-ecological level.

By considering past examples of resilience building campaigns, we can identify barriers faced by drought-vulnerable populations in other contexts and what promotive factors for resilience were encouraged and how, determining whether behaviour change was encouraged or achieved.

[30] "Regionalisation of the Global Integrated drought Monitoring and Prediction System (GUDMaPS) for Afghanistan" ECSOA December 2018
[31] Ibid

CASE STUDIES OF RESILIENCE

INTERNATIONAL

Resilience in the West: The Case of the United States

With the threat of climate change increasing the likelihood of drought on the US mainland, the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions conducted nation-wide research to identify best practises in increasing resilience to droughts. While some of the identified solutions include costly solutions heavily-reliant on technology, such as desalinisation plants, the study of communities who are currently significantly at risk of drought in the US reveals that meticulous planning and water-conservation wary attitudes can prove the most cost-effective strategy for increasing resilience to drought.[32] Water-conservation initiatives in the US are top-down initiatives instigated by lawmakers, encouraging the installation of low flow toilets, leak resistant plumbing, and banning turf. US authorities also encourage the construction of larger cisterns as well as the reuse for agricultural purposes of 'gray' water, used water which doesn't carry sewage. Authorities pursue the education of the public in drought risk and water conservation attitudes, encouraging for instance a watershed coordination systems, compensating farmers for implementing water conservation measures, such as decreasing watering of crops during growing stages where they are more drought-tolerant, thereby conserving water for necessary times. A combination of these measures paired with robust drought planning including drought monitoring and provisions for communicating with the public, have proved the best method in reducing the risk induced by drought in the United States.

While, as a western country, the US's strategy to increase resilience to drought is heavily technology based, this example does however reveal the two most important strategies in forging resilience: informing and warning populations of an impending drought, and encouraging water-conservation strategies. It is also a good example of how policy-level interventions can affect behaviours which increase resilience and significantly reduce risk associated with drought. By raising awareness of water conservation methods, cities like San Diego maintained their water use rates between 2010 and 1995 despite growth of population of 400,000.[33] The US changed attitudes to water-consumption at the policy level, providing incentives for reduced water use and punishing excessive use, triggering a change in behaviour.

[32] « Resilience strategies for drought », C2ES Center for climate and energy solutions, October 2018
[33] Ibid

Community-Led Change: The Case of Ethiopia

Eastern Africa and Ethiopia in particular have suffered from poor water management leading to droughts and reduced crops yields. The Government and UN have sought to improve resilience to drought throughout the country, and their experience in key communes such as Abreha we-Atsebeha, Lake Haramaya, Lake Ziway, prove valuable insights into best practise in changing behaviours to adopt better water management.

In Abreha we-Atsebeha, high rates of evaporation paired with unstable rainfall made it one of the most food-insecure areas of the country, suffering from periodic droughts and occasional flash floods. The Ethiopian government suggested relocation of the community to more fertile grounds, however the community decided to address its water management policy hindering its development, with help from the UN in 2003. The community dug trenches and dams along slopes to slow the downhill flow of water and encourage it into groundwater recharge, built artificial springs to conserve water and planted naturally occurring fruit tree species to restore biodiversity and improve soil quality.[34] Ground water recharge was encouraged through cheap methods such as soil bunds, semi-circular stone bunds, percolation ponds or check dams.[35] These methods proved effective and allowed the community to become self-sufficient food-wise. However, Aba Hawi, the community leader, expressed a belief that the key reason for the success of the initiative was the donors' willingness to support a community-led initiative rather than impose a change, i.e. that changing mindsets is more efficient than restoring the landscape to ensure long-term resilience.

Similarly in Lake Ziway, unregulated use of lake water paired with devastation of the biodiversity of the commune through fertilizer use and deforestation decreased the soil water retention quality and overall water resources. The Horn of Africa Regional Environment Center and Network devised water allocation plans to ensure reasonable use of resources. Environmental education of the population and monitoring tools were established to limit overuse of water. Farmer trainings were conducted, focusing on encouraging climate-smart agriculture and integrated pest management to naturally increase productivity, enhancing the capacities of communities to regulate their water use.[36]

The case of Ethiopia illustrates how low-cost water management behaviours can be encouraged amongst poverty-stricken and drought-vulnerable populations. This case study reveals that efficiently changing behaviours regarding water management relies

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[34] "Building resilience to drought: Learning from experience in the Horn of Africa" Global Water Parnership (Eastern Africa), IGAD, WMO 2016

35 "Characterization and impact assessment of water harvesting techniques: A case study of Abreha Atsbeha watershed, Tigray, Ethiopia." Department of Land resources management and Environmental protection Mekelle University

[36] "Building resilience to drought: Learning from experience in the Horn of Africa" Global Water Parnership (Eastern Africa), IGAD, WMO 2016

on supporting community-led initiatives and on education regarding the risks of climate change and potential techniques to properly manage water sources. This example demonstrates that community level interventions can affect physical resilience and encourage individual adoption of mitigation techniques

Conflict and Drought: The Case of Somalia

A durable drought over three seasons in 2016/2017 in Somalia contributed to a surge of IDPs in Somalia from 1.1 million to 2.1 million.[37] IDPs, while citing drought as a major factor for displacement, overwhelmingly express little desire to return to their AoO even if conditions were to improve (93%).[38] Insecurity consistently ranked as a significant driver of displacement, and IDPs expressed less feelings of insecurity while in IDP camps than rural populations who remained in their AoO, implying they feel safer in urban environments.[39] The Government of Somalia has recently developed a framework for resilience to palliate the impact of drought, the Drought Impact and Needs Assessment (DINA) was established to inform the Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF).

Government officials in Somalia view the return of IDPs to their AoO as the only durable solution, however previous droughts and displacements in Somalia, notably in 2011 suggest there is little hope of IDPs to voluntarily return.[40] UNDP Somalia identified enduring conflict, deregulating market prices, and environmental degradation (soil erosion, mismanagement, over-grazing), as the main challenges hindering resilience in rural Somalis.[41] UNDP has stressed the importance of a conflict-sensitive approach to building medium-long term drought resilience in Somalia as conflict and drought are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. For example, drought-resilience strategies should take into account the impact on employment and economic growth to ensure they are not abetting drivers of conflict, which also contribute to displacement. DINA identified what should be the foci of the RRF including increased water management awareness and facilities (pump-fed irrigation, deschek systems), better livestock management (use of drought resistant animals: goats and camels despite increased cost, and reduction of overgrazing), and encouraging diversification of livelihoods (petty traders, small businesses) to reduce the impact of drought on livelihoods. On the issue of IDPs, the strategy advocates improving access to livelihoods and water supplies in camps.[42]

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[37] "Somalia Drought Impact & Needs Assessment" UNDP Somalia
[38] "Drought, Displacement and Livelihood in Somalia/Somaliland: Time for gender-sensitive and protection focused approaches" REACH, NRC, DRC, OXFAM, Joint Agency Briefing Note June 2018
[39] Ibid
[40] Ibid
[41] "Somalia Drought Impact & Needs Assessment" UNDP Somalia
[42] Ibid

The short-term strategy for dealing with the impact of drought (until December 2019), relies on protecting the immediate livelihoods of populations at risk, providing veterinarian care for livestock, providing drought-tolerant seed varieties for the immediate harvest season and restocking infrastructure.[43] The RRF's plan for long term resilience focuses on increasing access to drought monitoring systems, by increasing number of emergency communication systems, as well as well as promoting the diversification of livelihoods of populations at risk. Emphasis is put on the effect of assets on resilience, with little provisions for psychological factors. The framework places the onus on institutions to spearhead resilience through policies and education programs, such as, watershed management policies, and skills development programs to increase employability in other sectors.[44]

The case of Somalia is a particularly relevant case study owing to its similarity with Afghanistan given the interplay of conflict and drought in both places. UNDP Somalia has identified specific behaviours that should be encouraged to increase resilience to drought without reinforcing the drivers of conflict. Water management, changing pastoralist traditions and diversifying livelihoods of rural Somalis increases resilience to drought and encourages economic growth and employment. While the campaign is still underway and the results of the aforementioned strategy are not yet clear, UNDP Somalia has identified initial best practices on how to tackle resilience in an conflict-ridden environment.

AFGHANISTAN

Drought of 2000

In 2000, Afghanistan experienced one of the most severe droughts since the 1970-71 drought which displaced many Afghans (an exact figure is lacking). The 2000 drought was induced by reduced rainfall and decreasing river flows over the course of the spring. 70% of *Qanats* (underground irrigation channels) and 85% of wells dried up, reducing the irrigation capacities of agricultural workers and decreasing crop yields. Over 400,000 IDPs left their AoO as a result of the prolonged drought.[45] Country wide, four million people were affected.[46]

With the fall of the Taliban in 2002, the responsibility for repatriating IDPs shifted to the new Government of Afghanistan and the UN under the United Nations Assistance Mission

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[43] "Somalia, Drought Impact Response Plan" OCHA 2019
44 "Somalia Recovery and Resilience Framework" June 2018
[45] Abdul Alim, Sharif Shobair in « The Pamir paradox : Water insecurity and hunger at the source of central Asia's rivers » Daniel Gerstle, Journal of International Affairs.
[46] « USCR Country Report Afghanistan : Statistics on refugees and other uprooted people » June 2001 US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants

Afghanistan (UNAMA). Policy at the time sought the return of IDPs to their AoO, and the UN sought to help 100,000 families to that end between 2002 and 2007. A 2005 National Policy defined the Government's strategy in encouraging the return of IDPs, charging the UN with protecting them while the Government attempted to identify solutions to the natural disasters that threaten their livelihoods in their AoO (floods, drought). As the stream of returnees slowed to a trickle in 2008 it was clear that IDPs did not want to return to their AoOs, resisting return due to enduring insecurity in rural areas, lack of economic opportunities and persistent drought depleting livestock and harvests.[47] Lack of concrete solutions to address the concerns of IDPs and persistent insecurity throughout rural Afghanistan condemned Government attempts to encourage the return of IDPs to failure.

The 2000 drought is illustrative of the fact that assisted voluntary returns of IDPs are unlikely to be significant insofar as they do not address the major concerns of displaced communities, namely conflict, drought resilience, and economic opportunity. It also reiterates the fact that conflict remains a major driver of displacement and obstruction to return, suggesting that a conflict-wary drought resilience strategy is the only plan that could prove effective in discouraging displacement in times of drought.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTERVENTION

POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES

Based on the frameworks outlined above as well as the findings from the case studies we have identified the following opportunities for intervention. This section identifies potential entry points for building resilience to drought with a particular focus on the individual and interpersonal levels which prove the most efficient to induce behavioural change. These are focused on the shifts in awareness and perceptions, as well as social norms, which would be needed to encourage the adoption of behaviours which would increase resilience to drought of current vulnerable populations. Further research is needed before specifying how to operationalize these changes through particular activities.

Increase impact of drought monitoring systems in risk reduction

- Develop efficient drought monitoring systems as well as wide-reaching warning dissemination channels to prevent future droughts from arriving relatively unexpectedly for farmers.

[47] "National Profile of Interally Displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan" UNHRC

- At the individual and interpersonal level, raise awareness among farmers and pastoralists of early warning systems for impending droughts, in order to trigger timely adoption water-conservation attitudes.

Encourage adoption of water-management strategies to mitigate impact of drought

- Raise awareness among farmers of water-conservation strategies (groundwater recharge techniques, use of drought-resistant livestock) and water-saving irrigation methods to increase available water supplies in the event of a drought. Increased yearly rainfall offers the opportunity to store more water during the rainy seasons in anticipation of dryer springs.
- Address perceive risks associated with adoption of these strategies and communicate on the support available for these alternatives to convince of do-ability and benefits and create intent to change.
- Identify and tackle structural barriers which hinder the adoption of alternative livelihoods.

Creating demand for alternative livelihoods to mitigate the impact of drought

- Increase awareness of opportunities to diversify livelihoods, and their benefits to increase its appeal and the target audience's interest.
- Increase awareness of crop-rotation methods, and potential of harvesting more drought-resilient plants to limit the impact of drought on agricultural yields.
- Identify and tackle structural barriers which hinder the adoption of alternative livelihoods
- Identify social norms which limit adaptive behaviour, and find whether there is social pressure to exercise traditional livelihoods.
- Create positive messaging around adopting various livelihoods which differ from the traditional pastoralist and farmer lifestyles, in order to promote positive attitudes towards livelihood diversification.

Engage influencers and community leaders

- If Afghans see their community leaders initiate water-conservation strategies rather than an artificial externally-imposed change, they are more likely to change their attitudes and adopt water-conservation behaviours. By encouraging trusted community leaders to be role models and early adopters of positive behaviours, we can utilize SBC principles to engender behaviour change among their constituents.
- Influencers, be they community leaders or highly trusted individuals, need to be informed and made aware of the challenge of drought and the importance of changing agricultural traditions. An attitudinal shift among influencers is essential in order for them to initiate community-led initiatives.

- Encouraging community-led initiatives, financing mitigation of impact projects instigated and driven by community members (ie. Reforestation, percolation ponds, water sharing programmes) rather than imposing external change. Interpersonal level change is more sustainable than policy-imposed change, as community members are more likely to maintain the level of effort needed for the upkeep of drought mitigating efforts if the behavioural change emanated from their own decision rather than if it was imposed.

Engage a religious perspective

- Faith remains a central factor in Afghans' decision making. Engaging religious leaders could prove valuable in promoting drought resilient behaviour.
- Koshesh and Iman are the bedrock of Afghan resilience, and including messaging highlighting the importance of perseverance as a precursor to divine protection could prove central in encouraging resilience.

Remain cautious of the context of conflict

- Develop a conflict-wary strategy to ensure that the resilience building strategy is not encouraging drivers of conflict.

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